Missouri Law Review
Volume 65
Issue 4 Fall 2000

Article 1

Fall 2000

New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax
Refunds: Its History, Operation and Policy, and Suggestions for
Reform, The
Bruce A. McGovern

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bruce A. McGovern, New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax Refunds: Its History,
Operation and Policy, and Suggestions for Reform, The, 65 MO. L. REV. (2000)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

McGovern: McGovern: New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax Refunds:

MISSOURI
LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 65

FALL 2000

NUMBER 4

The New Provision for Tolling the
Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax

Refunds: Its History, Operation and Policy,
and Suggestions for Reform
Bruce A. McGovern*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that
Congress enacted in 1998 that suspends the running of the limitations periods
that apply to claims for tax refunds. The provision suspends the limitations
periods when a taxpayer is "financially disabled," which is defined as being
unable to manage one's financial affairs due to a sufficiently severe, medically
determinable physical or mental impairment. Congress enacted this provision
in response to a series of cases that culminated in a decision of the United States
Supreme Court in which the Court held that courts could not equitably suspend,
or "toll," the refund limitations periods under any circumstances. The Article
discusses the long-standing judicial practice of tolling limitations periods as a
matter of equity and shows how the contours of this practice as applied to claims
against the federal government remain uncertain despite the Court's recent
efforts to provide guidance. The Article also sets forth the history of, explains

and illustrates the limitations periods that apply to administrative claims for tax
refunds, and demonstrates how an interpretation of these provisions that has

gained acceptance in some courts is incorrect. After chronicling the series of
cases that led Congress to enact the new Code provision, the Author critically
examines the new provision and provides guidance on issues of interpretation
that are likely to arise. The Author argues that the new provision is not well
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suited to the needs of the majority of taxpayers who are likely to seek its relief
and contains requirements that are antithetical to its underlying purpose. The

Article concludes by proposing four specific amendments to the new provision
and by suggesting specific areas in which administrative guidance is necessary
under the provision as it currently exists.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Those who pay too much in tax recover their overpayments by filing a
claim for refund.' For many taxpayers the process is straightforward. A worker
who has had too much tax withheld from her wages, for example, typically
claims a refund by filing with the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") a
return that sets forth the amount of the overpayment and the portion to be

refunded.2 But for many others the process is not straightforward. Taxpayers
who suffer from mental illness, for example, are often delayed in filing their
claims for refund. If the delay is too great, then their claims are barred by the
limitations periods set forth in Section 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code").3 If a taxpayer's administrative claim is barred, then the taxpayer also
is precluded from bringing suit for a refund in either a federal district court or the
United States Court of Federal Claims, the two courts with jurisdiction over
refund actions.' A taxpayer's filing of an administrative claim for refund thus
gives rise to two important questions: (1) whether the taxpayer has complied
with the limitations periods of Section 6511, and if not, (2) whether there are
circumstances in which the Service or a court can overlook the taxpayer's
noncompliance and treat the claim as timely filed. This Article addresses both
questions, but focuses primarily on the second. Specifically, the Article
examines Section 6511(h), a provision that Congress enacted in 19985 to define

1. I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977);
see infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
2. See infranotes 96-97 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text. Unless otherwise indicated, all
references to a "Section" or "Sections" are to a Section or Sections of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
4. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1994) (stating that administrative claim for refund is
prerequisite to bringing suit for refund); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1994) (granting United
States Court of Federal Claims and United States District Courts jurisdiction over tax
refund actions); infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
5. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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the circumstances in which the limitations periods in Section 6511 are
suspended, or "tolled," due to the taxpayer's incapacity.
One might expect that the analysis required to answer the question whether
a taxpayer has filed a timely claim for refund would be routine. But as the
United States Supreme Court recently observed, the language and interplay of
the various provisions of Section 6511 are "not simple. 6 Indeed, within the last
ten years the Court has considered the impact or proper interpretation of Section
6511 on five occasions! This complexity is a potential problem for a large

number ofpersons. According to the Service's most recent statistics, the Service
issues more than ninety million income tax refunds to individuals each year.8
The complexity of Section 6511 presents an especially difficult barrier for
taxpayers with disabilities. In a series of cases decided between 1990 and 1997,9
taxpayers who had failed to comply with the limitations periods of Section 6511
made a three-part argument: (1) under the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,"° federal courts can, as a matter of
equity, toll all limitations periods that run in favor of the federal government,
including the limitations periods of Section 6511, (2) the taxpayers had been
unable to comply with Section 6511's limitations periods for reasons such as
mental incompetence," severe alcoholism," or imprisonment with lack of access
to financial records, 3 and therefore (3) the court should equitably toll Section
651 I's limitations periods for the period during which the taxpayers were unable
to comply and treat their administrative claims for refund as timely filed. The
federal courts of appeals divided on the proper analysis of this argument. 4 In
1997, the Supreme Court resolved the dispute when it held in United States v.
Brockamp'5 that Congress had not intended to permit tolling of Section 651 1's
limitations periods. In response to the Brockamp decision, Congress added to
the Code new Section 6511(h), which provides that the running of certain

No. 105-206, § 3202(a), 112 Stat. 685, 740-41.
6. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347,350 (1997).
7. See Baral v. United States, 528 U.S. 431 (2000); Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 347;
Comm'r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996); United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995);
United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
8. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN tbl.1, at 164

(Spring 2000) (setting forth statistics for 1998).
9. See infra Part IV.A.
10. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
11. See, e.g., Wiltgen v. United States, 813 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (N.D. Iowa 1992);
Johnsen v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 834, 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
12. See Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499, 1503 (D. Haw. 1993), aff'd, 95-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,557 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
13. See Henderson v. Backaric, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,329 (D. Kan.
1995).
14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. 519 U.S. 347, 354 (1997); see infra Part IV.B.
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limitations periods in Section 6511 is suspended in a narrow set of
circumstances: when the taxpayer is unable to manage her financial affairs
because of a sufficiently severe, medically determinable physical or mental
impairment. 6
This Article examines Section 6511(h). Part II discusses the policy
concerns embodied in statutes of limitations and the long-standing practice of
tolling limitations periods both by statute and as a matter of equity. Part II also
discusses both the Supreme Court's decision in Irwin regarding equitable tolling
of limitations periods in actions against the federal government and the
confusion that the Court's decision has engendered. In Part III, the Article
explains the procedures for and limitations on obtaining a refund of tax and
traces the history of the limitations periods that apply to administrative claims
for refund. Part IV discusses the disagreement that developed in the federal
courts regarding whether the limitations periods of Section 6511 are subject to
equitable tolling and the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue in Brockamp.
Part V critically examines the operation and policy of the congressional response
to the Brockamp decision, new Section 6511(h). In Part VI, the Article
proposes four specific changes to Section 6511(h) to tailor the provision to the
needs of the majority of taxpayers who will seek its relief, to make the provision
less burdensome for both taxpayers and the government, and to eliminate
requirements that are antithetical to the statute's underlying purpose. Part VI
also argues that, until Congress amends the statute, the Service should implement
changes to the manner in which it interprets and administers Section 6511(h) as
it currently exists.
IX. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING
A. GeneralPrinciples
1. Statutes of Limitations
A statute of limitations sets forth a period of time during which a party can
assert a claim.' 7 The limitations period that a statute sets forth represents a
policy decision concerning the appropriate balance among the interests of those
asserting claims, those defending them, and society as a whole.' 8 Plaintiffs have

16. See I.R.C. § 6511(h) (Supp. IV 1998); infra Part V.
17. For a discussion of the history of statutes of limitations and references to earlier
works, see Note, Developments in the Law-Statutes ofLimitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177, 1177-81 (1950).
18. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,271 (1985) (stating that limitations period
represents "the State's judgment on the proper balance between the policies of repose and
the substantive policies of enforcement embodied in the state cause of action"). For a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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an interest in obtaining any legal or equitable relief to which they might be
entitled. Defendants, for a variety of reasons, have an interest in being relieved
of the need to defend against claims. For example, assurance that any claims are
barred assists defendants in choosing to dispose of records and in planning for
the future. Society as a whole has several, sometimes conflicting, interests.
These interests include seeing that meritorious claims of a plaintiff are
adjudicated, promoting the security of transactions, and promoting the integrity
of the judicial system by precluding the litigation of claims that present an
unreasonable risk of erroneous factfinding, i.e., those with respect to which
"evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared."' 9 With the passage of time, the balance among these interests
gradually shifts.2" At first the balance favors the assertion of claims, but
eventually favors repose. The limitations period that applies to a plaintiff's
claim defines the point at which the interests of plaintiffs and society in asserting
claims are outweighed by those of defendants and society in precluding them.
This is not to say that the shift in balance can be measured with scientific
precision, for the precise limitations period that a legislature chboses is to some
extent arbitrary.2' Rather, the specific limitations period chosen is a sort of
"rough justice" that represents the legislature's judgment as to when, in most
cases, the balance tips in favor of repose.
2. Tolling and Other Forms of Relief from the Statutory Bar
A limitations period will bar a claim only if two conditions are satisfied:
(1) before the party asserting the claim takes the required action (e.g., filing the
complaint), the limitations period begins to run, continues its full course, and

thoughtful discussion of these interests, see Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the
Limitations of Limitations Law, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1015, 1019-26 (1997). See also
Christopher R. Leslie, Den of Inequity: The Casefor EquitableDoctrines in Rule J0b-5
Cases, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1589-91 (1993) (discussing purposes of statutes of
limitations); Note, Statutes ofLimitations,supra note 17, at 1185-86 (same).
19. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)); see also
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (stating that statutes of limitations
free courts from '"aving to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously
impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading
memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise").
20. See OrderofR.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 349 (stating that "even if one has
ajust claim[,] it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period
of limitation and... the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the
right to prosecute them").
21. See John P. Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitations, 31

MICH. L. REv. 591, 596 (1933) (noting that "[t]he lack of exact methods for measuring
these vague and remote interests of society will undoubtedly justify the use, in
legislation, of exact and even arbitrary tests").

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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expires, and (2) the party defending the claim is permitted to assert the bar of the
statute of limitations. The concept of tolling addresses the first condition. A
related concept, estoppel, addresses the second.
a. Statutory Tolling
Depending on the context, the term "tolling" can refer either to postponing
the commencement of a limitations period or to suspending the running of the
period once it has begun.' In both senses of the word, tolling has long been
prescribed by statute. The statute of James I,' from which the first American
statutes of limitations were derived,24 provided that if, at the time the cause of

action accrued, the person entitled to assert the claim was "within the age of
twenty-one years,feme covert,25 non compos mentis,26 impri[s]oned or beyond

the [s]ea[s]," then the limitations periods of the statute would not commence
until the impediment to bringing the claim had ceased.27 Modem American
statutes continue this tradition. For example, state statutes commonly defer or
suspend the running of limitations periods for periods of time during which a
resident defendant is absent from the state 8 or a plaintiff is either a minor or
mentally incompetent.29 Similarly, state statutes often contain a "date of
discovery" rule for certain actions, such as for professional malpractice, under
which the limitations period begins to run only from the date on which the
plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the basis for her cause of action.30

22. See Richardson, supranote 18, at 1039-40.
23. 21 Jam., ch. 16, 7 Stats. at Large 273 (1623).
24. See Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 532,538 (1867); Dawson, supra note 21, at 597
&n.14.
25. A married woman. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 617 (6th ed. 1990).
26. Not of sound mind. Id. at 1051.
27. 21 Jam., ch. 16, § 7, 7 Stats. at Large 275 (1623).
28. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.051(1)(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 2000); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-3-96 (1999); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-208 (West 1992); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 516.200 (1994); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 207 (McKinney Supp. 2000); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.16.180 (West 1988). See generallyNote, Statutes ofLimitations,supra
note 17, at 1224-28 (discussing development of these "absence" exceptions).
29. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-8 (Supp. 1999); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 352 (West
1982 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.051(1)(h) (West Supp. 2000); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-211 (West 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 7 (Law. Co-op.
1992 & Supp. 2000); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 208 (McKinney 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01229(A) (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.190 (West Supp. 2000).
30. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a) (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
52-584 (1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36(2) (Supp. 2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-222
(1995); UTAH CODEANN. § 78-14-4 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 521 (Supp. 2000).
Many of these "date of discovery" statutes impose an absolute, outside limit on the

plaintiff's ability to assert a claim. For example, the Nebraska statute, which applies to

actions for professional negligence, provides that the action
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1 must be commenced within
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Although less commonly than their state counterparts, some federal statutes of
limitations also expressly defer or suspend the running of limitations periods
under specified conditions."
b. Equitable Tolling
Even when a statute of limitations is silent on the availability of tolling,

courts are often persuaded to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. Under this
doctrine, courts defer or suspend the running of a limitations period in two
general circumstances: (1) when the nature of the alleged wrong, or the
defendant's subsequent actions to conceal the alleged wrong, have prevented the
plaintiff from discovering the basis for her claim, and (2) when extraordinary
circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control have prevented the plaintiff from
asserting the claim in a timely manner.
The first of these two justifications for judicial tolling originated in the
context of civil actions based on the defendant's alleged fraud.32 From an early
date, courts were receptive to the argument that the plaintiffs claim, although
seemingly asserted after the limitations period had expired, should not be barred
because the nature of the fraud prevented the plaintiff from discovering her
claim.33 Under this fraud exception, courts delayed the commencement of the
limitations period until the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the
claim. In circumstances where the defendant's alleged wrong could not be
labeled "fraudulent," such as the defendant's mere breach of contract, some
courts acknowledged a similar doctrine, known as fraudulent concealment, under

two years after the alleged act or omission, but if the plaintiff did not and could not with
reasonable diligence discover the act or omission within that two-year period, then the
plaintiff may commence the action within one year after the plaintiff discovered or
should have discovered the alleged act or omission. In no event, however, can the
plaintiff bring the action more than ten years after the alleged act or omission. See NEB.
REv. STAT. § 25-222 (1995).
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1994) (civil actions against the United States
generally must be commenced within six years from time right of action accrues, but
"[the action of any person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim
accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability ceases"); 26 U.S.C. §
7508(a) (1994) (period of service in armed forces in "combat zone" not included in
determining whether taxpayer has timely taken certain actions, such as filing income tax
return).
32. See Cerbone v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 768 F.2d 45,48 (2d Cir.
1985). See generally Dawson, supra note 21, at 597-606 (discussing development of
fraud exception); Lyman Johnson, SecuritiesFraudandthe MirageofRepose, 1992 Wis.

L. REV. 607, 633-55 (same).
33. See Booth v. Lord Warrington, 2 Eng. Rep. 111 (1714); First Mass. Turnpike
Co. v. Field, 3 Mass. 201 (1807); see also Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 348 (1874)
(discussing courts' applications of the fraud exception in actions at law and in equity).
See generally Dawson, supranote 21, at 597-606 (discussing cases).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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which the court would defer the commencement of a limitations period because
of the defendant's subsequent, affirmative steps to conceal the alleged
wrongdoing from the plaintiff.'T Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, the
wrong that gives rise to the plaintiff's claim is not self-concealing; rather, it is
the defendant's subsequent action that conceals the wrong from the plaintiff.
The distinction between the fraud and fraudulent concealment exceptions
has become blurred over the years. 35 The United States Supreme Court first
applied these exceptions to a federal limitations period in Bailey v. Glover,5 in
which the Court held that "when the fraud has been concealed, or is of such
character as to conceal itself, the [two-year limitation on a bankruptcy assignee's
right to recover property] does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered by,
or becomes known to, the party suing, or those in privity with him," provided
that "there has been no negligence or laches on the part of a plaintiff in coming
' By
to the knowledge of the fraud."37
the time of the Court's decision seventythree years later in Holmberg v. Armbrecht,38 the acceptance and fusion of these
exceptions in the federal courts appears to have been complete. 39 The Court in
Armbrecht stated categorically that "[t]his equitable doctrine is read into every
federal statute of limitation."' Today, the federal courts generally apply the
doctrine of "equitable tolling" to delay the commencement of limitations periods
without distinguishing between the original fraud and fraudulent concealment
exceptions. Unfortunately, the modem legacy of these judicially-created
exceptions is confusion as to what a plaintiff must show in order to be eligible
for equitable tolling based on the defendant's alleged fraud or fraudulent
concealment. For example, it is often unclear whether a court will treat a

34. See, e.g., Quimby v. Blackey, 63 N.H. 77 (1884); Munson v. Hallowell, 26

Tex. 475 (1863). See generally John P. Dawson, FraudulentConcealment andStatutes
of Limitations, 31 MICH. L. REv. 875, 880 (1933); Johnson, supranote 32, at 637-41;
Note, Statutes ofLimitations, supranote 17, at 1220-24.
35. Commentators continue to debate the extent to which the fraud and fraudulent
concealment exceptions originally were separate doctrines. Compare Johnson, supra
note 32, at 644 ("[A]fter Bailey v. Glover[, 88 U.S. 342 (1874),] as before, they were
separate doctrines. The Court, recognizing this, often invoked the separate doctrine of
fraudulent concealment to suspend a limitations period."), with Richard L. Marcus,
FraudulentConcealment in Federal Court: Toward a More DisparateStandard?, 71
GEo. L.J. 829, 856-57 (1983) ("Thus arose the often-cited distinction between tolling

requirements for fraud (in which concealment need not be proved) and fraudulent

concealment (in which it was required), a supposed dichotomy that has had an uneasy
life.").

36. 88 U.S. 342 (1874).
37. Id. at 349-50.
38. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
39. See Marcus, supra note 35, at 839-42 (discussing federal development of
fraudulent concealment doctrine and the Court's decision in Armbrecht); Johnson, supra
note 32,at 646-50 (same).
40. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 397.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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plaintiff's claim as an assertion of "fraud," thereby eliminating the need to prove
concealment,4' and whether a plaintiff who seeks tolling must show diligence in
discovering the alleged wrong in all cases, or only in cases where the plaintiff
has not alleged active concealment by the defendant.42
The second justification that courts commonly give for applying the
doctrine of equitable tolling is that extraordinary circumstances beyond the
plaintiff's control have prevented the plaintiff from asserting the claim in a
timely manner. For example, courts have tolled limitations periods when war
has closed the courts with jurisdiction over the matter 3 or has prevented the
plaintiff from serving the defendant with process." Similarly, at least one court

has tolled a limitations period when the plaintiff could not timely bring his action

because during war he was imprisoned overseas. 41 Other extraordinary
circumstances that have formed the basis for tolling include the plaintiff's
effective lack of access to fair adjudication of claims because the military had
seized power ' and the plaintiff's inability to bring an action because the court
had declared, in response to legislation found unconstitutional on appeal, that it
would not consider the plaintiffs claim. 47 The federal courts currently are
divided on the question whether a plaintiff's mental incapacity is a circumstance
that justifies equitable tolling.'

41. See Marcus, supra note 35, at 865-70 (discussing how courts have excused
plaintiffs from proving concealment through liberal interpretations of the term "fraud").
42. See Marcus, supra note 35, at 874-901 (discussing relationship between
plaintiff's diligence and defendant's concealment); Leslie, supra note 18, at 1593-95
(discussing the courts' varying requirements regarding the need for a plaintiff to show
diligence in order to obtain tolling).
43. See Levy v. Stewart, 78 U.S. 244, 253-55 (1870) (state limitations period
suspended because courts of Louisiana closed during war); The Protector, 76 U.S. 687,
690 (1869) (time for filing appeal in Supreme Court from judgment of federal district
court in Alabama suspended during war); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 532, 541 (1867)
(state limitations period suspended because courts of Arkansas closed during war);
Borovitz v. Am. Hard Rubber Co., 287 F. 368, 370-71 (N.D. Ohio 1923) (Ohio's twoyear limitations period for wrongful death actions suspended during World War I because
plaintiff, resident of Austria-Hungary, could not bring suit in United States during those
years).
44. See United States v. Wiley, 78 U.S. 508, 512-14 (1870) (federal limitations
period for suits based on bond given by United States Marshal suspended because
Marshal resided in Virginia during war and could not be served with process).
45. See Osboume v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947).
46. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1550-51 (N.D. Cal. 1987)

(claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 by individuals who had been seized by military
personnel in Argentina, for torts committed by aliens in violation of international law).
47. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 931 F.2d 590,595-97 (9th Cir. 1991),
rev'd on othergrounds, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
48. Compare Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 852 F.2d 516, 522-23 (10th Cir.
1988) (limitations period applicable to claim under Section 4(b) of Commodities
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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The two categories of cases in which courts apply the doctrine of equitable
tolling differ in that in the first (the defendant has committed fraud or has
fraudulently concealed the basis for the plaintiffs claim), the defendant is in
some way responsible for the plaintiffs failure to assert the claim in a timely
manner. In the second category (extraordinary circumstances beyond the
plaintiffs control), the defendant might not be responsible for the plaintiffs
delay. In essence, however, both categories reflect judicial dissatisfaction with
the results obtained by mechanically applying a fixed limitations period in
specific cases. One might view equitable tolling as a form of highly suspect
judicial legislation because its application upsets the balance among competing
interests established by the legislature. The courts, however, appear to view
themselves as fulfilling the legislature's intent by taking into account the
unstated assumptions underlying the statute, such as the assumptions that the
plaintiff is aware of the defendant's wrongdoing, that the plaintiff has not been
prevented from becoming aware of it by the defendant's affirmative attempts to
hide it, and that extraordinary circumstances, such as closure of the court
involved, have not made it impossible for the plaintiff to comply with the
limitatidns period.4 9 Under this view, the balance struck by the legislature is
provisional and subject to adjustment in individual cases."0
Exchange Act cannot be tolled based on mental illness), and Casias v. United States, 532
F.2d 1339, 1342 (10th Cir. 1976) (insanity cannot form basis for tolling period for filing
administrative claim under Federal Tort Claims Act), and Accardi v. United States, 435
F.2d 1239, 1241 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970) (same), and Williams v. United States, 228 F.2d 129,
132 (4th Cir. 1955) (two year period for filing suit under Suits in Admiralty Act cannot
be tolled due to insanity), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956), with Nunnally v.
MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1993) (mental illness provides an available ground
for tolling 30-day period for filing suit set forth in Civil Service Reform Act), and
Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1990) (remanding civil rights suit
for determination of applicable statute of limitations and whether it was tolled due to

plaintiffs mental incompetence), and Miller v. Gould, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7299
(N.D. Ill. May 15, 1992) (plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of incapacity to
withstand stimmaryjudgment motion based on plaintiff s failure to comply with 30-day
period for seeking administrative action in discrimination suit under Title VII).
49. Examples of this view include the following statement by the Supreme Court:
Statutes of limitations are ... enacted upon the presumption that one having
a well-founded claim will not delay enforcing it beyond a reasonable time, if

he has the power to sue. Such reasonable time is therefore defined and
allowed. But the basis of the presumption is gone whenever the ability to
resort to the courts has been taken away. In such a case the creditor has not
the time within which to bring his suit that the statute contemplated he should
have.

Wiley, 78 U.S. at 513-14; see also Osbourne, 164 F.2d at 769 ("when a plaintiff has been
denied access to the courts, the basis of the [legislative] assumption has been destroyed");

Johnson, supra note 32, at 636 (discussing possible justifications for deferring or
suspending limitations periods).
50. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 634.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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c. Equitable Estoppel and its Relationship to Equitable Tolling

A doctrine that is closely related to equitable tolling is equitable estoppel.5
Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, courts preclude a defendant from
raising the statute of limitations as a defense when the plaintiff was aware of her
claim, but was somehow misled by the defendant into not asserting it until after
the limitations period had passed. For example, courts have estopped defendants
from asserting the statute of limitations when they have misled a plaintiff into
believing that the statutory period for filing was longer than it actually was5 or
when they have assured plaintiffs of their intent to settle and the plaintiff, "in
reasonable reliance on that assurance, delay[ed] in bringing his suit until after the
statute ha[d] run."53
To state with accuracy the distinction between equitable tolling and
equitable estoppel is an elusive and ultimately unproductive goal. The difficulty
in establishing the distinction is reflected in the confusing manner in which the
courts discuss the doctrines. For example, courts sometimes state that equitable
estoppel is merely another name for fraudulent concealment, a doctrine that, as
discussed earlier," has to some extent lost its separate identity and is now
viewed by many courts as merely one justification for equitable tolling. 6

51. See generally John P. Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes ofLimitation, 34 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (1935) (discussing different factual circumstances in which courts apply the
doctrine of estoppel and other possible theories that courts might use to reach the same
results).

52. See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959)
("petitioner was justifiably misled into a good-faith belief that he could begin his action
at any time within seven years after it had accrued"); cf.Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154,
162-64 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ninety-day period never began to run because EEOC notice to
plaintiff incorrectly stated that plaintiff had thirty, rather than ninety days, to bring suit).
53. Cerbone v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 768 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir.
1985) (Newman, J.).
54. See Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences/The Chicago Med.
Sch., 167 F.3d 1170, 1174 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[e]quitable estoppel-sometimes referred
to as fraudulent concealment"); see also United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 49
(1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("We are not confronted with the question whether a
doctrine such as fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel might apply if the
Government were guilty of outrageous misconduct that prevented the plaintiff, though
fully aware of the Government's claim of title, from knowing of her own claim. Those
doctrines are distinct from equitable tolling.").
55. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
56. Although the situations in which courts apply equitable estoppel resemble some
situations in which courts apply equitable tolling based on fraudulent concealment, the
doctrines are not the same because equitable estoppel presumes that the plaintiff is aware
of her claim and fraudulent concealment presumes that she is not. See Dawson, supra
note 51, at 23-24; see also Marcus, supra note 35, at 863 (discussing similarity between
situation in which courts apply fraudulent concealment because the defendant denied any
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Similarly, courts sometimes state that the critical distinction between equitable
tolling and equitable estoppel is that tolling applies when the plaintiff is unaware
of her claim and equitable estoppel applies when the plaintiff is aware of it. 7
This distinction is not accurate, however, because it refers only to the first
category of cases in which courts toll limitations periods, i.e., those that involve
the defendant's self-concealing wrongdoing or subsequent attempts to conceal
the wrongdoing. The second category of cases in which courts permit tollingextraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiffs control-often involve
situations in which the plaintiff is aware of her claim but nevertheless is
prevented from asserting it in a timely manner." Such attempts to distinguish
the doctrines ultimately serve little purpose.59 The doctrines are best thought of
as different labels that courts apply to their long-standing practice of deferring
or suspending limitations periods in appropriate factual circumstances.
B. Equitable Tolling in Actions Against the FederalGovernment
1. The Issue
The question whether a federal court can equitably toll a limitations period
in an action against the federal government has long defied a clear answer. In
contrast to a private party, the government is immune from suit unless it
expressly consents to be sued. 60 The government's consent to be sued, i.e., its
waiver of sovereign immunity, is contingent on the plaintiff's compliance with
the applicable statute of limitations 6 ' Further, federal courts are courts of
limited subject matter jurisdiction in the sense that they generally possess only
whatever jurisdiction Congress has granted. 2 Therefore, a plaintiffs failure to
assert her claim against the government within the prescribed limitations period
deprives a court of jurisdiction to hear the claim. 3 If a claimant's failure to

wrongdoing and situations in which courts apply equitable estoppel).
57. See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111, 124 (1st Cir.
1998); Cerbone, 768 F.2d at 49-50; Armbrister v. Roland Int'l Corp., 667 F. Supp. 802,
809 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
58. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
59. See Dawson, supra note 51, at 23-25 (discussing relationship of estoppel to the
fraud and fraudulent concealment doctrines and concluding that "[a] sharp line of
demarcation between estoppel and other recognized grounds for suspension of limitation
acts would serve no useful purpose").
60. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
61. See United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986); United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979).
62. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
63. See Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 841; Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 677
(1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]hough no one would claim that failure to satisfy a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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comply with a limitations period deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction,
then the court seemingly is without power to grant itselfjurisdiction by tolling
the period.
The incongruity of a federal court granting itself subject matter jurisdiction
by tolling a limitations period has led to a number of inconsistent decisions and
approaches to tolling in actions against the government. Some decisions have
suggested that tolling is never permissible.' Others have suggested that the
court must determine whether Congress intended the time period to be
"jurisdictional."65 If so, then the period cannot be tolled.66 But if Congress
intended the period to be merely a "nonjurisdictional" statute of limitations, then
the period can be tolled.'7 In attempting to discern congressional intent on this
point, courts have focused on factors such as the particular language used in the
statute, the location of the time limitation in the statutory structure, and whether
Congress had a broad remedial purpose in enacting the legislation of which the
time limitation was a part. In a decision rendered as recently as 1985, the
Supreme Court suggested that the availability of tolling in actions against the
government was an unanswered question."
2. The Supreme Court's 1990 Decision in
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs
In Irwin v. Departmentof Veterans Affairs,69 the Supreme Court sought to
clarify the analysis for determining whether periods of limitation that run in
favor of the federal government can be equitably tolled. In Irwin, the plaintiff
asserted that he had been unlawfully discharged from his position with a
Veterans Administration Medical Center in violation of Title VII of the Civil

statute of limitations in a case between private parties would serve as ajurisdictional bar
to the plaintiff's suit, we have long held that a statute of limitations attached to a waiver
of sovereign immunity functions as a condition on the waiver and defines the limits of
the district court's jurisdiction to hear a claim against the United States.").
64. See Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957) ("[C]ongress was
entitled to assume that the limitation period it prescribed meant just that period and no
more.").
65. See generally Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality,Time, and the Legal Imagination,
23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1994) (critically analyzing doctrine ofjurisdictional time limits).
66. See, e.g., McIntyre v. United States, 789 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986).
67. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); Bowen
v. New York, 476 U.S. 467,479 (1986); see also Dane, supranote 65, at 5 n.7, 12 n.27
(collecting cases).
68. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 94 n.10 (1985) ("Statutory filing
deadlines are generally subject to the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.
• . . Whether this general principle applies to deadlines that run in favor of the
Government is a question on which we express no opinion today.").
69. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
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Rights Act of 19640 and other federal statutes. After the Veterans
Administration rejected Mr. Irwin's claim, he appealed to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC similarly rejected his claim
and issued a notice that informed him of the EEOC's decision and of his right
to challenge the decision by bringing an action in federal district court. By
statute, Mr. Irwin was7 required to bring the action within thirty days after
"receipt" of the notice. ' He filed his action within thirty days after the date on
which he claimed to have personally received the EEOC's notice, but more than
thirty days after the notice was received in the office of his attorney. His
attorney, a sole practitioner, was overseas training with his U.S. Army Reserve
unit on the date the notice was delivered to his office.
The Court held that Mr. Irwin's action was untimely because the thirty-day
limitations period ran from the date the notice was received in his attorney's
office,72 and then addressed whether the thirty-day period could be equitably
tolled. The Court acknowledged that the thirty-day time limit "is a condition to
' The
the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed."73
Court further acknowledged that its "previous cases dealing with [tolling] ha[d]
not been entirely consistent."74 After noting that the language used by Congress
in establishing limitations periods for claims against the government often varies,
the Court concluded:
[W]e are not persuaded that the difference [in statutory language] is
enough to manifest a different congressional intent with respect to the
availability of equitable tolling. Thus a continuing effort on our part
to decide each case on an ad hoc basis, as we appear to have done in
the past, would have the disadvantage of continuing unpredictability
without the corresponding advantage of greater fidelity to the intent of
Congress. We think that this case affords us an opportunity to adopt
a more generalrule to govern the applicabilityof equitabletolling in
suits againstthe Government.

70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
71. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 91-92. In 1991, Congress lengthened the period for
bringing suit to ninety days after receipt of the EEOC notice. See Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 114(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified as amended at42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994)); see also Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 162 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (discussing 1991 amendment).
72. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 92-93.
73. Id. at 94.
74. Id. The Court specifically referred to its prior decisions in Soriano, see supra
note 64, which suggested that equitable tolling is never available in actions against the
government, and Locke, see supra note 68, which suggested that the availability of
equitable tolling is an unanswered question.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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..Once Congress has made... a waiver [of sovereign immunity],

we think that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits
against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private
suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver.
Such a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative
intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation. We
therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable
tolling applicableto suits againstprivate defendants should also apply
to suits againstthe United States.
Congress, of course, may provide
7
otherwise ifit wishes to do so.
After the crescendo leading to the Court's new rule, the Court's disposition
of Mr. Irwin's claim was anticlimactic. The Court noted that, in untimely suits
between private parties, "[f]ederal courts have extended equitable relief only
sparingly."76 The Court further noted that its own decisions had permitted
equitable tolling only when (1) a claimant had diligently pursued his judicial
remedies by filing a complaint in the wrong court, or (2) the claimant had been
induced or tricked by his adversary into missing the filing deadline. 77 Mr.
Irwin's case, the Court concluded, involved "at best a garden variety claim of
excusable neglect" that did not warrant tolling.7"
3. Equitable Tolling in the Wake of Irwin
Unfortunately, the Irwin decision has done little to clarify when a federal
court can equitably toll a limitations period that applies to a claim against the
federal government. In some respects, it has added to the confusion. This is so
for at least two reasons. First, the Court's subsequent decisions make clear that
tolling may be impermissible even when Congress does not prohibit tolling
explicitly, thereby requiring federal courts to divine congressional intent on this
point.79 In two post-Irwin decisions that address equitable tolling in the context

75. Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (emphasis
added).

76. Id. at 96.
77. Id. The Court's characterization of its prior decisions reflects the difficult time
that courts have in distinguishing equitable tolling from equitable estoppel. See supra
notes 54-59 and accompanying text. The Irwin Court's reference to a prior decision in
which it had "equitably tolled" a limitations period because "the claimant had been
induced or tricked by his adversary into missing the filing deadline" is to Glus v.
Brooklyn EasternDistrictTerminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959), a decision in which the Court

expressly applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
78. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96.
79. The Court has thus dashed the hopes of some judges in the lower federal courts.
See Wood-Ivey Sys. Corp. v. United States, 4 F.3d 961, 964 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Plager, J.,
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of claims against the federal government, the Court has demonstrated that the
inquiry now required is whether the language and structure of a statute and its
underlying legislative purpose suggest that Congress intended to preclude
tolling."0 This is precisely the type of inquiry with which pre-Irwin courts
struggled in attempting to determine whether a limitations period was
"jurisdictional" or "nonjurisdictional"'' and with which courts continue to
struggle in analyzing statutes to determine the scope of the government's waiver
of sovereign immunitys2 Thus, the Court in Irwin did not provide a simplified
mode of analysis. Rather, it clarified only one point: that in the absence of
congressional intent to the contrary, limitations periods that favor the
government can be tolled.
A second reason that the Irwin decision has failed to clarify the law is that
it is open to the interpretation that federal courts can equitably toll a limitations
period that favors the government only when (1) the same type of claim can be
asserted against both private parties and the federal government, and (2) tolling
would be available in the action against the-private party. A number of lower
federal courts read Irwin in this manner." The Supreme Court itself contributed

concurring) (After Irwin, "[i]t is no longer necessary for courts to offer unconvincing
explanations as to why some statutory time limits are waivable and some not. It is now
presumed that Congress intends traditional waivers to be available, unless Congress
expressly specifies otherwise.").
80. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1998); United States v.
Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997); see also Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting
Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act: The Impact of Brockamp and
Beggerly, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 885, 897-98 (1999) (discussing the Court's approach
to tolling in Beggerly and Brockamp). For a discussion of the Court's decision in
Brockamp, see infra Part IV.B.
81. The lower federal courts continue to be mired by the "jurisdictional" and
"nonjurisdictional" labels. A debate has arisen as to whether limitations periods that
favor the federal government are no longer 'jurisdictional" after Irwin. See Bath Iron
Works Corp. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1567, 1572 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Wood-Ivey Sys.,
4 F.3d at 965-68 (Nies, J., dissenting); Dillard v. Runyon, 928 F. Supp. 1316, 1324-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (collecting cases), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1369 (2d Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table decision).
82. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192-97 (1996) (assessing whether United
States waived sovereign immunity against monetary damages in Section 504(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-37
(1992) (assessing whether United States waived sovereign immunity against monetary
damages in Section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code).
83. See, e.g., Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Michel, J.,
concurring) ("in Irwin equitable tolling was permitted against the government in Title VII
suits because equitable tolling was also permitted in Title VII private suits"); RHI
Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1459, 1462-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("equitable
tolling may not always be available to a plaintiff in a cause of action against the
Government when that cause of action is not identical to a private cause of action");
United States v. Lancman, Civ. No. 4-95-880, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9173, at 18 (D.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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to this confusion in UnitedStates v. Brockamp,84 in which the Court considered
whether federal courts can equitably toll the limitations period on filing claims
for tax refunds." The Court stated cryptically that it was "willing to assume,
favorably to the taxpayers but only for argument's sake, that a tax refund suit
and a private suit for restitution are sufficiently similar to warrant asking Irwin's
negatively phrased question: Is there good reason to believe that Congress did
not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?"86 This statement appears to
confirm that, to receive the benefit of tolling in connection with a claim against
the government, a claimant must first establish that the same, or at least a similar
claim, could be asserted against a private party, and that tolling would be
available in such a private action. Such a requirement is inappropriate. The
Irwin opinion contains no suggestion that the Court's holding is limited to

situations in which the same action is available against both private parties and
the government. Nor would such a limitation make sense: the message of Irwin
is not that there should be parity of treatment when the same action is brought
against either a private party or the government, but that the difficult question of
congressional intent regarding tolling can best be answered by presuming that
tolling applies unless Congress provides otherwise. Requiring a preliminary
inquiry into whether comparable actions are available against both private parties
and the government will serve only to make the analysis of whether tolling is
permissible for claims against the government even more complex.
III. PROCEDURES FOR AND LIMITATIONS ON OBTAINING CREDITS
OR REFUNDS OF TAx
A. Overview of Procedure
When a taxpayer makes an overpayment of tax, the Code authorizes the
Service to credit the overpayment against any tax liability of the taxpayer and to
refund the balance.87 In the case of an individual, overpayments of income tax

Minn. Jan. 20, 1998) ("In our view, however, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Irwin
strongly suggests that its holding is limited to statutes which authorize similar actions
against both private entities and the Federal Government.").
84. 519 U.S. 347 (1997).

85. See infra Part IV.B.
86. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350.
87. See I.R.C. § 6402(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The Code does not specifically
define the term "overpayment." I.R.C. § 6401(a) (1994) (overpayment "includes" tax
assessed or collected after expiration of statute of limitations). In general terms, an
overpayment is any payment of tax in excess of the tax properly due. See Jones v.
Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 531 (1947); Video Training Source, Inc. v. United
States, 991 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-60 (D. Colo. 1998); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 11.02[l], at 11-5 to 11-6 (2d ed. 1991).

88. Because requests for relief from the limitations periods that apply to claims for
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commonly arise in one of two ways: (1) the taxpayer makes excessive advance
payments of tax in the form of estimated tax payments or amounts withheld from
wages,89 or (2) the taxpayer is audited by the Service and, following the
Service's issuance of a notice of deficiency9" and assessment9' of the tax due,

refunds arise most commonly in connection with income taxes, this Article will focus on
the income tax and provide references to estate, gift, and other taxes in appropriate
places.
89. In accordance with prescribed tables and procedures, employers generally are
required to withhold income tax from wages that they pay to employees. See I.R.C. §
3402(a)(1) (1994). Employers are liable for the tax withheld, which acts as an obvious
incentive for employers to remit the tax to the government. See I.R.C. § 3403 (1994).
In addition, certain taxpayers, including individuals, are required to make installment
payments of estimated tax during their taxable year. The requirement to make estimated
tax payments is not set forth explicitly in the Code, but instead is implicit in the penalties
that apply if a taxpayer fails to make adequate prepayments of tax. See I.R.C. § 6654
(1994).
90. In general terms, a tax "deficiency" is the excess of the amount of tax properly
due from the taxpayer over the amount shown as the tax due on the taxpayer's return.
See I.R.C. § 6211(a) (1994). As the name suggests, a "notice of deficiency" is the
document by which the Service notifies the taxpayer of the amount of the deficiency
determined by the Service. See I.R.C. § 6212(a) (1994) (authorizing Service to issue
notice of deficiency). In response to a notice of deficiency, a taxpayer who wishes to
contest the deficiency has two choices: either (1) file a petition for redetermination of
the deficiency with the United States Tax Court, which is an attractive option because the
taxpayer need not pay the alleged deficiency before bringing suit, see I.R.C. §§ 6213(a),
7442 (1994), or (2) pay the tax allegedly due, file a claim for credit or refund with the
Service and, if the Service fails to act upon or denies the claim, bring suit for a refund in
either the United States Court of Federal Claims or a United States District Court, see
I.R.C. §§ 6532(a)(1), 7422(a) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1994). A taxpayer who
wishes to pursue the first option, i.e., file a petition with the Tax Court, must do so within
ninety days after the Service mails the notice of deficiency (or 150 days if the notice is
addressed to a person outside the United States). See I.R.C. § 6213 (a), (c) (1994). If the
taxpayer fails to meet this time requirement, then the taxpayer can contest the deficiency
only by pursuing the second option.
91. An "assessment" of tax is the formal recording of the taxpayer's tax liability
by the Secretary of the Treasury. See I.RC. § 6203 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 301.6203-1 (as
amended in 1982); see also Fullmer v. United States, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,657, at 90,166 (D. Wyo. 1993); Elias v. United States, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,131, at 87,482 (C.D. Cal. 1992); SALTZMAN, supra note 87, 10.01, at 10-2 & S10-2
(Supp. 2000). The Secretary generally cannot assess a tax before the expiration of ninety
days after the date on which the Secretary mails to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency.
See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1994); supra note 90 (explanation of deficiency and notice of
deficiency). The purpose of this ninety-day period is to give the taxpayer an opportunity
to contest the deficiency by filing a petition with the United States Tax Court. If the
taxpayer does not file a petition within the ninety-day period, then the Secretary is free
to assess the tax. Assessment is significant in part because, absent an assessment of the
.tax within the prescribed limitations period, the Service cannot collect or retain an
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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pays an additional amount of tax. In either case, the first step that a taxpayer
must take to recover the overpayment is to file a claim with the Service for credit
or refund9" of the tax."
A claim for refund must satisfy certain requirements. Among other
requirements, the claim must set forth the amount of the tax overpayment, direct
the Service whether to refund the overpayment or apply it against the following
year's tax liability, and state in detail each ground upon which the refund is
claimed.94 If the claim fails to satisfy the applicable requirements, then the
taxpayer generally will be precluded from recovering her overpayment of tax.9"
In the case of income taxes, a taxpayer generally must claim a refund on the
original return that the taxpayer files for the year.96 Thus, in the typical case of
an individual who has made a tax overpayment by making excessive estimated
tax payments or having too much withheld from her wages, the individual's

amount as a tax. See generally SALTZMAN, supranote 87, 10.01, at 10-2.
92. For convenience, this Article will refer to a claim for credit or refund of tax
simply as a "claim for refund."
93. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1994).
94. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6402-3(a)(5) (as amended in 1997), 301.6402-2(b)(1)
(as amended in 1977).
95. See, e.g., Weiler v. United States, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,241, at
83,895 (9th Cir. 1996) (claim filed by taxpayer did not contain required declaration under
penalties of perjury); Clement v. United States, 405 F.2d 703, 705 (1st Cir. 1969)
(referring to previous dismissal of taxpayer's refund suit because refund claim filed "[t]o
protect taxpayer's Constitutional rights" failed to meet specificity requirements of
regulations); Irwin v. United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,804, at 89,641 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (return filled out with zeros on which taxpayer requested refund was not
valid claim for refund); England v. United States, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,590,
at 86,036 (D. Kan. 1990) (taxpayers failed to file claim articulating that they sought a
refund and on what basis); Cole v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCII) 9538, at 87,791 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (taxpayer's claim did not set forth grounds
for refund with particularity); Davis v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9794,
at 85,614 (D. Mass. 1980) (same). Despite the general requirements that a claim must
satisfy in order to constitute a valid claim for refund, the courts, in an apparent exercise
of their equitable powers, have developed the doctrine that a technically deficient
communication from the taxpayer to the Service can constitute an "informal" claim that
satisfies the requirement that the taxpayer file an administrative claim for refund. See,
e.g., United States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186, 197 (1941); United States v. Memphis Cotton
Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67 (1933); Radin v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 38, 40-41 (D.
Conn. 1988); Crocker v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). To be
considered an informal claim, the communication generally must be in writing and set
forth sufficient information to apprise the Service that the taxpayer seeks a refund and
to allow the Service to begin an examination of the claim. See, e.g., Yuen v. United
States, 825 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1987); O'Day Equip., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.
Supp. 444,447 (D.N.D. 1978).
96. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(1) (as amended in 1997).
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income tax return constitutes a claim for refund.97 If the taxpayer already has
filed the return and wishes to claim a refund (e.g., because the taxpayer
inadvertently neglected to claim a valid deduction and therefore overpaid her
tax), the taxpayer must file an amended return.98
Once the taxpayer files a claim for refund,, the Service reviews the claim
and will either allow or disallow it, in whole or in part.99 If the Service does not
render a decision on the claim within six months after the taxpayer files it, the
taxpayer can initiate a suit for refund in either the United States Court of Federal
Claims or a United States District Court."° If the Service disallows the
taxpayer's claim, the taxpayer must commence the refund action within two
years after the date on which the Service mails the taxpayer a notice of
disallowance.' The jurisdiction of both the Court of Federal Claims and the
district court to hear tax refund actions is limited, however, to those cases in
which the taxpayer has "duly filed" a claim for refund with the Service. 0 2 To
be "duly filed," a claim for refund must be filed within the period of limitations
prescribed by Code Section 6511. 103 That is, unless the taxpayer files a timely
claim for refund with the Service, neither court has jurisdiction to hear the
taxpayer's refund action. 4

97. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(5) (as amended in 1997) (properly executed
return constitutes claim for refund).
98. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(2) (as amended in 1997). In the case of an
individual, the proper form for an amended return generally is I.R.S. Form 1040X.

Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(2) (as amended in 1997).
99. See Treas. Reg. § 601.103(c)(3) (as amended in 1984). The Service must
provide the taxpayer with an explanation of the reason or reasons for the disallowance.
See I.R.C. § 6402(k) (Supp. IV 1998).
100. See I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) (1994) (taxpayer may not commence suit before the
expiration of six months from filing claim); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1994) (granting
United States Court of Federal Claims and United States District Courts jurisdiction over
tax refund actions).
101. See I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) (1994).
102. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1994). Section 7422(a) provides:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority,
or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the
regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.

I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1994).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601-02 (1990); Little People's

Sch., Inc. v. United States, 842 F.2d 570, 573-74 (1st Cir. 1988).
104. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 240 (1996); Dalm, 494 U.S. at

601-02.
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Accordingly, in order for a taxpayer to maintain a tax refund action, it is
critical that the taxpayer's filing with the Service constitute a "claim for refund"
and, more important for present purposes, that the claim be filed with the Service
within the period of limitations set forth in Section 6511 of the Code.
B. Limitations on Claimsfor Refund
1. Current Limitations: Section 6511 of the Code
a. The Statutory Provisions
To obtain a refund of tax, a taxpayer must file a claim for refund within a
specified period of time. Section 6511(a) of the Code provides in relevant part:
Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by
this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return
shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return
was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such
periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer,
within 2 years from the time the tax was paid."0 5
Thus, under Section 6511(a), the taxpayer must file a claim for refund either
within three years from the date the taxpayer filed the return or within two years
from the date the taxpayer paid the tax. If the taxpayer fails to file the claim
within one of these periods, then Section 651 1(b)(1) prohibits the Service from
making the refund. 6
In order to simplify determinations under Section 6511 (a), the Code sets
forth rules for determining the dates on which a taxpayer files a return and pays
tax. If the taxpayer files a tax return before it is due, the return is treated for
purposes of Section 6511(a) as if it were filed on the due date.'0 7 For most
individual taxpayers, the due date of the return is the fifteenth day of April
following the close of the calendar year for which tax liability is being
determined' 8 Similarly, advance payments of tax made by individuals through

105. I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1994).
106. See I.R.C. § 6511(b)(1) (1994). Refunds of tax made after the periods of
limitation in Section 6511 (a) have expired are treated as "erroneous" unless the taxpayer
has filed a claim for refund within those periods. See I.R.C. § 6514(a)(1) (1994). The
government can recover an erroneous refund through a civil court action. See I.R.C. §
7405(a) (1994).
107. See I.R.C. § 6513(a) (1994).
108. The vast majority of individual taxpayers use the calendar year as their taxable
year and therefore are required to file their returns on or before April 15 of the year
following the close of the taxable year. See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1) (1994) (individuals
generally required to file income tax returns); I.R.C. § 6072(a) (1994) (income tax returns
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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estimated tax payments or withholding from wages"° generally are treated for
purposes of Section 651 l(a) as if they were made on the following April 15."'
Even if a taxpayer files a claim for refund within one of the periods
prescribed by Section 6511(a), the amount of tax that the taxpayer can recover
may be limited by Section 651 1(b)(2). Section 6511(b)(2) provides in relevant
part:
(A) Limit where claim filed within 3-year period
If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period
prescribed in subsection (a), the amount of the credit or refund
shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period,
immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years
plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return....
(B) Limit where claim not filed within 3-year period
If the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount
of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid
during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the
claim."'
Thus, under Section 6511 (a) a taxpayer must file a claim for refund either
within three years from the time the return was filed or within two years from the
time the tax was paid. If the taxpayer files the claim within the three-year period
of Section 6511 (a), then under Section 651 l(b)(2)(A) the taxpayer can recover
only the portion of the tax paid during the period preceding the filing of the
refund claim equal to three years plus any extension of time the taxpayer may
have obtained for filing the return. If the taxpayer files the refund claim more
than three years after the taxpayer filed the return, but within two years after the
taxpayer paid the tax (so that the two-year period of Section 6511 (a) is satisfied),
then under Section 651 1(b)(2)(B) the taxpayer can recover only the portion of
the tax paid during the two years preceding the filing of the refund claim. If the
taxpayer files the refund claim outside of both the three-year and two-year
periods of Section 6511 (a), then the claim is untimely and the Service has no
authority to make a refund."'

based on calendar year must be filed on or before the following April 15).
109. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
110. See I.R.C. § 6513(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
111. I.R.C. § 6511 (b)(2)(A), (B) (1994).
112. See I.R.C. § 6511(b)(1) (1994).
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b. Some Examples
The following examples illustrate the interaction of Sections 651 l(a) and
6511(b)(2).
(1) Example 1: The Typical Case-An Original Return as a Claim for Refund
During calendar year 1995, a taxpayer has $5,000 of income tax withheld
from her wages and, on April 15, 1996, files an income tax return showing a tax
liability of only $4,200. Provided that the return is properly executed, the return
constitutes a claim for refund." 3 Because the taxpayer filed the return and the
claim for refund simultaneously, the refund claim was filed within three years
from the time the return was filed and therefore is timely under Section 6511(a).
The tax payments withheld from the taxpayer's wages are treated for purposes
of Section 6511 as made on April 15, 1996."' Because this date is within the
three year period preceding the filing of the refund claim, Section 651 1(b)(2)(A)
does not limit the amount of the taxpayer's claimed $800 refund.
(2) Example 2: An Amended Return as a Claim for Refund
During calendar year 1995, a taxpayer has $5,000 of income tax withheld
from her wages and, on April 15, 1996, files an income tax return showing a tax
liability of $5,000. On June 1, 1998, the taxpayer files an amended return for
1995 that shows a tax liability of only $4,200. Provided that the amended return
is properly executed, it constitutes a claim for refund."5 Because the taxpayer
filed the claim for refund within three years after filing her original return, the
claim is timely under Section 6511(a). The tax payments withheld from the
taxpayer's wages are treated for purposes of Section 6511 as made on April 15,
1996."6 Because this date is within the three year period preceding her filing of
the refund claim, Section 6511(b)(2)(A) does not limit the amount of the
taxpayer's claimed $800 refund.
(3) Example 3: A Late Return as a Claim for Refund-the Majority and
Minority Views
During calendar year 1995, a taxpayer has $5,000 of income tax withheld
from her wages. The taxpayer does not request an extension of time to file her
1995 income tax return. On June 1, 1999, the taxpayer files a properly executed
return for 1995 showing a tax liability of $4,200. That is, the taxpayer's return

113.
114.
115.
116.

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 6513(b)(1) (1994); supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 6513(b)(1) (1994); supranotes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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is late. In this situation, there is a split of authority on how Section 6511(a)
applies. Under the Service's published position 7 and the prevailing view in the
courts,"' the phrase "within 3 years from the time the return was filed" in
Section 6511(a) does not distinguish between timely and untimely returns. If

this is correct, then the taxpayer's filing of the return in this example triggers a
three-year period within which she can file a claim for refund. As in example
1, because the taxpayer filed her return and claim for refund simultaneously, she
filed her claim for refund within three years of filing the return and the claim
therefore is timely under Section 6511(a). The taxpayer's refund nevertheless
is barred by Section 651 1(b)(2)(A): the tax withheld from the taxpayer's wages
is treated as paid on April 15, 1996,"' which is more than three years before
June 1, 1999, the date on which the taxpayer filed the claim for refund. Thus,
under the majority view, the taxpayer's refund claim is timely under Section
65 11(a), but is barred by Section 6511 (b)(2)(A).
Under the minority view, which appears to be confined to courts in the
Ninth Circuit, the taxpayer's refund claim in this third example is not timely

under Section 6511(a).

20

In Miller v. United States,'2' the Ninth Circuit held

that, to constitute a "return" for purposes of Section 6511(a), a return must be

filed within two years from the time the tax was paid." Because the taxpayer
in this example filed her return more than two years after the date on which she

117. See Rev. Rul. 76-511, 1976-2 C.B. 428.
118. See, e.g., Lundy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 45 F.3d 856, 867-68 (4th Cir.
1995), revdon othergrounds, 516 U.S. 235 (1996); Richards v. Comm'r, 37 F.3d 587,
591 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1092 (1996); Galuska v. Comm'r, 5 F.3d
195, 197 (7th Cir. 1993); Video Training Source, Inc. v. United States, 991 F. Supp.

1256, 1260-62 (D. Colo. 1998); Smith v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,593, at 86,050 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Mills v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 448, 450 (E.D.
Tex. 1992); Graham v. Internal Revenue Serv., 602 F. Supp. 864, 865 (W.D. Pa. 1984);
Joseph v. Internal Revenue Serv., 637 F. Supp. 1219, 1219 (D. Mass. 1983); Rainey v.
United States, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9442, at 84,584 (N.D. Ala. 1982); Chatman
v. United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9240, at 83,498 (E.D. Va. 1981); McLeod
v. United States, 229 Ct. CI. 810, 810 (1982) (per curiam).
119. See I.R.C. § 6513(b)(1) (1994); supranotes 107-10 and accompanying text.
120. See Miller v. United States, 38 F.3d 473,475-76 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Ott
v. United States, 141 F.3d 1306, 1307 (9th Cir. 1998); Ratzesberger v. United States, 992 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH') 50,858, at 89,835 (E.D. Wash. 1999); Roman v. United States,

95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CC) 50,591, at 89,958 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Musser v. United States,
92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,245, at 83,951 (D. Alaska 1991); Amzen v. Internal
Revenue Serv., 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,020, at 87,099 (W.D. Wash. 1990);
SALTZMAN, supra note 87,

11.05[1][a], at 11-27 to 11-28 & S11-22 to S1 1-28 (Supp.
2000) (advocating minority view).
121. 38 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1994).
122. See id. at 475 ('The point at which one must determine whether a return has
or has not been filed, for purposes of [Section 6511(a)], must be two years after
payment.").
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is treated as having paid the tax, she is treated, according to the Ninth Circuit, as
if she had not filed a return. Her claim for refund therefore can satisfy Section
6511(a) only if she filed it within two years of the time the tax was paid.23
Because she is treated as having paid the tax withheld from her wages on April
15, 1996, and filed her claim for refund on June 1, 1999, she fails to meet this
requirement. Under the minority view of these facts, the refund claim is
untimely under Section 6511(a) and the limits on the amount of tax recoverable,
found in Section 6511(b)(2), never come into play. Although in the current
example the majority and minority views lead to the same result (the taxpayer's
inability to obtain a refund), this will not always be the case. 24
The minority view is unpersuasive" 2 and is contrary to the Supreme Court's
recent analysis in Baralv. UnitedStates.'2 6 In Baral,the Court assumed on facts
substantially similar to those of the present example that the taxpayer's late
return constituted a timely claim for refund under Section 6511 (a) and that the
taxpayer's claim
was barred by the three-year look-back period of Section
27

651 1(b)(2)(A).'

The minority position also has been called into serious question by
Congress's 1997 amendment of Code Section 6512(b)(3), which limits the
amount of tax that the Tax Court can order to be refunded." Congress amended
this provision in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v.
Lundy. 29 The facts in Lundy were similar to those in the current example. The
taxpayers in Lundy had income tax withheld from their wages for their 1987
taxable year, which were treated for purposes of Section 6511 as paid on April
15, 1988.'
They did not file their 1987 income tax return, on which they

123. See I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1994) (refund claim must be filed within two years from
time tax was paid "if no return was filed by the taxpayer").
124. See Rossman v. Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,081, at 87,291 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding refund claim untimely that would have been timely under majority
view had taxpayer brought refund action in district court or Court of Federal Claims),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1092 (1996).
125. See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
126. 528 U.S. 431 (2000).
127. The taxpayer's claim in Baral would have been barred whether the Court
adopted the majority or minority view. Because the Court did not acknowledge the
division in the lower federal courts on this question and did not offer any extended
analysis of the proper treatment of a late return under Section 6511(a), it is possible to
view Baral as leaving the proper treatment of a late return in this situation as an
unanswered question.
128. See I.R.C. § 6512(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1998) (last sentence). Although a taxpayer
cannot bring a suit for refund in the Tax Court, see supranote 90, the Tax Court has
jurisdiction to order a refund if, in considering the taxpayer's request for a
redetermination of the alleged deficiency, it determines that a refund is due. See I.R.C.
§ 6512(b)(1) (1994).
129. 516 U.S. 235 (1996).
130. See I.R.C. § 6513(b)(1) (1994); supranotes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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claimed a refund, until December 1990.' The Service had mailed a notice of
deficiency' to the taxpayers in September 1990, i.e., before the taxpayers had
filed their 1987 return.' 33 After filing their return and claim for refund in
December 1990, the taxpayers chose not to bring an action for a refund in either
a federal district court or the Court of Federal Claims, but instead to seek a
redetermination of the alleged deficiency in the Tax Court.'34
In the Tax Court, the taxpayers in Lundy claimed not only that they did not
owe the deficiency, but also that they had overpaid their tax for 1987.' The
Service argued that, even if this were the case, Section 6512(b)(3)(B) barred the
Tax Court from ordering a refund. 3 6 Section 6512(b)(3)(B) directs the Tax
Court to apply the look-back periods of Section 6511 (b)(2) in determining the
amount of tax that can be refunded. The Service argued that Section
6512(b)(3)(B) imposed the two-year look-back period of Section 651 l(b)(2)(B),
rather than the three-year look-back period of Section 6511 (b)(2)(A), when, as
in Lundy, the taxpayers had not filed a return on the date the Service mailed the
notice of deficiency.'37 The taxpayers in Lundy responded that, had they chosen
to bring a refund action in a federal district court or the Court of Federal Claims,
their late return would have constituted a timely claim for refund under Section
6511(a) and they would have been eligible for the three-year look-back period
of Section 6511 (b)(2)(A), so that their refund would not be barred (the majority
view discussed above).' 38 Congress, they argued, could not have intended that
taxpayers be penalized by choosing instead to pursue their claim in the Tax
Court.
The Court in Lundy agreed with the Service. It assumed without deciding
that the taxpayers were correct that their refund claim would not be barred had
they chosen a different forum. 139 Nevertheless, the Court concluded, "[]e ...
find in this disparity
no excuse to change the limitations scheme that Congress
140
has crafted.'

131. See Lundy, 516 U.S. at 237.
132. See supranote 90 (discussing deficiency and notice of deficiency).
133. See Lundy, 516 U.S. at 237.
134. See id.; supranote 90 (discussing choice of forum available to taxpayer who
has received notice of deficiency).
135. Comm'r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 237 (1996).
136. See id. at 238.
137. See id. at 245.
138. See id. at 250-5 1.
139. See id. at 251. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas indicated that he is
prepared to hold that the Service's position in Rev. Rul. 76-511, see supra notes 117-18
and accompanying text, which is the majority view on the proper treatment of a late-filed
return under Section 651 1(a), is correct. See Lundy, 516 U.S. at 253-57 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).

140. Lundy, 516 U.S. at 252.
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28

McGovern: McGovern: New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax Refunds:

2000]

TAXREFUNDS

In the following year, Congress amended Section 6512(b)(3) to change the
result in Lundy by making clear that the three-year look-back period of Section
651 1(b)(2)(A) should apply in similar cases in the Tax Court. 1 ' According to
the Committee Reports that accompanied the amendment, Congress believed that
the taxpayers in Lundy would have been entitled to a refund had they brought a
refund action in a district court or the Court of Federal Claims, and that "it is
appropriate to eliminate this disparate treatment" of actions brought in the Tax
Court. 4 Thus, the Congress that amended Section 6512(b)(3) adopted the
majority view discussed above regarding the proper treatment of a late-filed
return under Section 6511(a). Although the views of a subsequent Congress on
previously enacted legislation are not binding on the courts, a compelling
reason now exists for the abandonment of the minority view. Under the minority
view, taxpayers such as those in Lundy will be barred from obtaining a refund
in a district court or the Court of Federal Claims, but will successfully obtain a
refund if they pursue their claim in the Tax Court. This is precisely the disparity
that Congress intended to eliminate.
In Miller v. United States,'44 the Ninth Circuit offered three rationales for
the minority view, none of which are persuasive. First, the court reasoned that
to allow the late filing of a return to trigger a three-year period for filing a claim
for refund would render meaningless the rule in Section 6511 (a) that a refund
claim must be filed within two years after the tax was paid "if no return was filed
by the taxpayer." That is, this latter rule would never apply, according to the
court, if the late filing of a return can at any time trigger a three-year period for
filing a refund claim. This concern is unfounded because circumstances exist in
which taxpayers who have not filed a return file claims for refund. For example,
if a taxpayer has failed to file a return, the Service often prepares a substitute
return 45 and assesses the tax due for the year. The taxpayer can choose to pay
the tax and then seek a refund of it without ever filing a return. The taxpayer
might do this by sending a letter to the Service that meets the requirements of a
formal claim for refund or that a court is willing to treat as a valid informal
refund claim." Indeed, the legislative history of Section 651 l(a) suggests that

141. See I.R.C. § 6512(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1998) (last sentence).
142. S. REP. No. 105-33, at 656 (1997).
143. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998)
(quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963)).

144. 38 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1994).
145. See I.R.C. § 6020(b) (1994).

146. See Elias v. United States, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,131, at 87,483
(C.D. Cal. 1992) (treating taxpayer who never filed tax returns but who sent to IRS letters
seeking refund as having filed valid claims for refund, but granting summary judgment
to government), aff'd in part, 17 F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision);
supranote 95 (discussing informal claims for refund).
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Congress in 1934 added the language regarding circumstances in 1which
"no
47
return was filed by the taxpayer" to address precisely this situation.

Second, the Ninth Circuit inMiller argued that a contrary position "would
render meaningless... the two-year period of § 6511 (b)(2)(B)."' 14 That is, the
court could foresee no circumstances in which this limit on the amount of tax
recoverable would apply if a late return is treated in all circumstances as a
"return" for purposes of Section 6511(a). This concern similarly is unfounded;
as this Article will demonstrate shortly, 149 the two-year limit on the amount of
tax redoverable in Section 6511 (b)(2)(B) was designed to (and often does) apply
in situations where a taxpayer files a timely return but makes a subsequent tax
payment more than three years after the return was filed.
Finally, the court in Miller reasoned that a contrary holding would lead to
a disparity in results between refund actions brought in district court and actions
for redetermination of a deficiency brought in the Tax Court. 5 ' As discussed
above,' it is now the Ninth Circuit's minority position that leads to a disparity
in results.
(4) Example 4: An Audit and Subsequent Payment of Additional Tax
During calendar year 1995, a taxpayer has $4,200 of income tax withheld
from her wages and, on April 15, 1996, files an income tax return showing a tax
liability of $4,200. After a subsequent audit in which the Service determines that
the taxpayer's correct tax liability for 1995 is $5,000, the taxpayer pays an
additional $800 in tax on June 1, 1999. On December 31, 1999, the taxpayer
files a claim for refund seeking to recover both the $800 paid on June 1 and an
additional $1,000 based on her inadvertent failure to claim a valid deduction in
1995. Although the taxpayer filed the claim for refund more than three years
after she filed the return, the claim for refund is timely under Section 6511 (a)
because the taxpayer filed the claim within two years from the time she paid the
additional $800 in tax. The taxpayer's potential recovery is limited, however,
by Section 651 1(b)(2)(B) to $800, the tax paid within the two years preceding
the date on which the taxpayer filed the refund claim.

147. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 322(b)(1), 48 Stat. 680, 750; An Act to
ProvideRevenue, Equalize Taxation andFor Other Purposes: Hearingson H.R. 7835

Before the S.Comm. on Finance,73d Cong. 210, 211 (1934) (statements of Sen. Barkley
and L.H. Parker, Chief of Staff of the J. Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation).
148. Miller, 38 F.3d at 476.
149. See discussion infra Parts III.B.l.b.(4) (example 4), III.B.2.b.
150. Miller v. United States, 38 F.3d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1994).
151. See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1

30

McGovern: McGovern: New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax Refunds:
TAXREFUNDS
2000]

2. History and Policy of the Limitations on Claims for Refund
Two concepts discussed in the preceding section have been present in the
federal tax system from a very early stage: (1) taxpayers who seek a refund of
tax must do so by presenting to the Service a claim for refund within specified
periods of time and subject to limits on the amount of tax recoverable, and
(2) federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear a suit for refund unless the
taxpayer has first filed with the Service a claim for refund that conforms to the
applicable limits. The purpose of the second rule is fairly obvious: a claim for
refund provides the agency charged with the administration of the tax laws the
opportunity to consider the basis for the taxpayer's claim and to resolve the
matter without resort to litigation.'52 The purpose of the first rule, and
particularly the intricate rules of Section 6511, is less obvious. To understand
their purpose, one must first understand how the current rules developed.
a. Origin of the Limitations on Claims for Refund
Soon after the enactment of the federal income tax in 1913,153 Congress
enacted a provision that specifically authorized claims for refund of income
tax." 4 This provision imposed no limit on either the period during which
taxpayers could file claims for refund or the amount of tax recoverable.' 55 The
first restriction on claims for income tax refunds, enacted in 1918, provided
simply that no refund could be allowed more than five years after the taxpayer's
return was due "unless before the expiration of such five years a claim therefor
'
is filed by the taxpayer."156
Congress chose a five-year period in order to

152. See, e.g., John W. Piester, Tax Refund Claims and DistrictCourts Actions, 4
TRIAL LAW. GuIDE 273, 287 (1960); Maurice E. Stark, Claimsfor Refund of Federal
Taxes, 41 IowA L. REv. 496,498 (1956).

153. Prior to 1954, claims for refund of income, estate, and gift taxes were
governed by separate limitations provisions. In that year, claims for refund of all three
taxes became subject to the limitations set forth in Section 6511. See H.R. REP. No. 831337, at A415 (1954). Because Section 6511 derives from the pre-1954 provisions that
governed claims for refund of income taxes, this Article will not discuss the pre-1954
provisions that governed claims for refund of estate and gift taxes.
154. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 14(a), 39 Stat. 756, 772.

155. Prior to Congress's enactment of the income tax, claims for refund of federal
taxes were governed by Section 3228 of the Revised Statutes, which required that claims
for refund be filed within two years after the tax was paid. See Act of June 6, 1872, ch.

315, § 44, 17 Stat. 230, 257. The provision that Congress enacted specifically to address
income tax refund claims, Section 14(a) of the 1916 Act, see supra note 154, took claims
for refund of income tax outside of the general rule of Section 3228 and imposed no limit

on either the filing period or the amount of the refund.
156. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 252, 40 Stat. 1057, 1085.
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provide taxpayers with the same period of time within which to seek a refund as
the government had to assess tax."7
b. Revenue Act of 1924: The Predecessor of Section 651 1(b)(2)
The first limit on the amount of tax recoverable, i.e., the first predecessor
of current Code Section 6511(b)(2), appeared in 1924. In the Revenue Act of
1924, Congress abandoned the original rule that a claim for refund must be filed
within a specified period after the return was due. Instead, the 1924 legislation
required that claims for refund of income tax be filed within four years from the
time the tax was paid.' 58 At the same time, Congress added the further limitation
that "the amount of the credit or refund [shall not] exceed the portion of the tax
paid during the four years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.' 9
Congress enacted this restriction "[iun order that a late payment of a small
portion of the tax due may not extend the time for filing a claim for refund of the
entire tax."'' 6 That is, the restriction was targeted at situations such as that
described in example number four, discussed earlier. 61 The restriction precluded
a taxpayer from arguing that she was entitled to recover tax paid more than four
years before she filed the claim because the claim was filed within four years
after the full amount of the tx due for the year was paid. 62 Stated another way,
by limiting the amount of the refund recoverable Congress intended to permit
refunds of only those portions of the tax paid with respect to which the refund
claim was filed in a timely manner.

157. See S.REP.No. 65-617, at 10 (1918).
158. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 281 (b), 43 Stat. 253, 301. By 1924, the
filing limitations period originally enacted in the Revenue Act of 1918 had been amended
in 1921 and again in 1923 to provide that claims for refund must be filed within five
years from the time the return was due or within two years from the time the tax was
paid. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 252, 42 Stat. 227, 268; Act of March 4, 1923,
ch. 276, 42 Stat. 1504, 1505. The 1924 amendment's "four-year-from-payment" rule was
an attempt to simplify the filing limitations period. See S.REP. No. 68-398, at 33 (1924).
Unfortunately, as current Section 6511 is witness, the quest for simplicity ultimately
failed.

159. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 281(b), 43 Stat. 253, 301.
160. S.REP. No. 68-398, at 33 (1924).
161. See supraPart III.B.l.b.(4).
162. Section 3228 of the Revised Statutes, which during the 1920s limited the

period during which claims for refund of estate tax could be filed, contained no similar
restriction on the amount of tax recoverable. See supra note 155. Several taxpayers
successfully asserted that the absence of such a restriction allowed an estate, by making

a small payment of additional tax, to recover tax paid many years earlier. See, e.g., Estate
of Hills v. United States, 50 F.2d 302, 304-07 (Ct. Cl. 1931) (estate recovered taxes paid
in 1921 (the year in issue) through 1928 refund claim because estate had paid additional
tax in 1925).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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c. Revenue Act of 1934: A "Clerical" Change
By 1934, the provision limiting refunds of income tax had begun to
resemble closely current Section 6511 of the Code. Like Sections 6511 (a) and
6511(b)(1), Section 322(b)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1934 provided that no
refund could be made more than three years from the time the taxpayer filed the
return or more than two years from the time the taxpayer paid the tax, whichever
was later, unless the taxpayer filed a claim for refund within the applicable
period.' o Congress again chose these periods to ensure that taxpayers would not
have a longer period within which to seek a refund than the Service had to assess
tax,'t " a situation that sometimes had arisen under prior law.' 65 Regardless of
whether the taxpayer satisfied the three-years-from-filing or two-years-frompayment period, Section 322(b)(2) of the 1934 legislation limited the amount of
the refund to the portion of the tax paid during the three years immediately
preceding the filing of the claim." The only explanation given for this limit was
that it constituted
"a clerical change.., to carry out the policy in subsection
67
(b)(1):4

163. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 322(b)(1), 48 Stat. 680, 750.
164. See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 35 (1934).
165. When the Revenue Act of 1934 was adopted, taxpayers were permitted to pay
their income tax in installments, with the last installment due nine months after the due
date of the return. Under the limitations period that existed immediately before the
adoption of the 1934 legislation, taxpayers had to file claims for refund within two years
from the time the tax was paid. See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 322(b), 47 Stat.
169, 242. This meant that taxpayers could file claims for refund for at least a portion of
their tax up to two years and nine months after filing their timely returns. In contrast, the
limitations period on assessments of tax was two years from the date the return was due,
so that taxpayers in many cases had a nine month advantage over the government. The
1934 Act corrected this perceived imbalance by establishing the basic limitations periods
for both refund claims and assessments as three years from the date the return was filed.
See H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 35 (1934); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
73d CONG., 2d SESS., PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE: PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A
SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS RELATIVE TO METHODS OF PREVENTING
THE AVOIDANCE AND EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS TOGETHER WITH
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF 21 (Comm. Print

1933); An Act to Provide Revenue, Equalize Taxation and For Other Purposes:
Hearingson H.R. 7835 Before the S. Comm. on Finance,73d Cong. 210, 211 (1934)
(statement of Dr. Roswell Magill, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury). Congress

undoubtedly enacted the alternative "two year from payment" limitation to cover the
common situation in which, following an audit, a taxpayer makes an additional tax
payment many years after the taxpayer filed the return. See supra text accompanying
notes 151-52.

166. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 322(b)(2), 48 Stat. 680, 750.
167. H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 35 (1934).
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The 1934 legislation thus represents the first time that Congress combined
(1) the rule currently found in Section 6511(a) that treats a claim for refund as
timely if it is filed within three years from the time the taxpayer files the return,
with (2) a limit on the amount of tax recoverable (comparable to the rules of
current Sections 651 1(b)(2)(A) and (B)). Although Congress provided no clear
explanation as to why this combination was necessary, the reason is readily
apparent: like the event that triggers the two-year period for filing a refund
claim (the payment of tax), the event that triggers the three-year period for filing
a claim (filing the return), is within the taxpayer's control and can occur many
years after ,the tax year in question. Absent a limit on the amount of tax
recoverable, a taxpayer could at any time file a late return that also constitutes
a timely claim for refund (the majority view discussed above in example three)'68
and thereby recover tax paid many years earlier. This view of Congress's motive
for combining a three-year-from-filing rule with a limit on the amount of tax
recoverable is consistent with the general focus of the Revenue Act of 1934,
which was the prevention of tax avoidance and the improvement and
simplification of the revenue laws. 69
d. Revenue Act of 1942: The Form of Current Section 6511(b)(2) Emerges
In 1942, Congress apparently recognized that the three-year look-back rule
enacted in 1934170 allowed taxpayers to recover tax for which they could not
have filed a timely claim for refund. To illustrate, assume that a taxpayer files
her return for year 1 on April 15 of year 2 and, because of a lack of funds, delays
making her final tax payment for year 1 until August 1 of year 2. After April 15
of year 5, the taxpayer no longer can file a timely claim for refund of the tax she
paid in year 2, because the claim would be filed neither within three years from
the time she filed the return nor within two years from the time she paid the tax.
Under the statute enacted in 1934, however, if the taxpayer makes a small
additional payment of tax, e.g., a payment on June 1 of year 5 in response to an
IRS audit, the taxpayer could file an immediate claim for refund, which would
be timely because it would be filed within two years from the time she paid the
tax on June 1 of year 5.Thus, the taxpayer could potentially recover all taxes
paid within the preceding three-year period, including the tax she paid on August

168. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73d CONG., 2d
SESS., PREVENTION OF TAx AVOIDANcE: PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A SUBCOMM. OF THE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS RELATIVE TO METHODS OF PREVENTING THE AVOIDANCE
AND EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE

SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF, at IlI
(Comm. Print 1933) ("it is thought
imperative to transmit to the Ways and Means Committee a preliminary report
recommending methods of preventing tax evasion and avoidance, together with certain
suggestions for improving and simplifying the revenue laws").

170. See supranotes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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1 of year 2. Congress addressed this problem in the Revenue Act of 1942 by
specifying that, when a refund claim is timely under the two-year-from-payment
rule, the applicable look-back period is two years. 7'
e. Internal Revenue Code of 1954: A Source of Confusion
In 1954, the refund provision found its current home in Section 6511 of the
Code.' 72 The House version of Section 6511 kept the basic structure adopted in
1934 and 1942: a refund claim was timely under Section 65 11(a) if filed either
within three years from the time the taxpayer filed the return or within two years
from the payment of tax, and the look-back period of Section 6511(b)(2) was
three or two years, depending on the period used to qualify the claim as timely. 73
The House Ways and Means Committee emphasized that the limitations of
Section 65 l(a) were "consistent with the new uniform rule in Section 6501,
relating to the period of limitations on assessments."' 74 In the Senate, the filing
periods of Section 6511(a) were changed, without explanation, to the later of

three years from the due date of the return (determined without regard to
175

extensions of time to file) or two years from the time the taxpayer paid the tax.
Given the consistent congressional effort to have the period for filing a refund
claim be consistent with the government's period for assessment (which ran from
the date of actual filing of the return), this amendment seems out of place. The
Senate nevertheless prevailed, and Section 6511(a) was enacted in that form. 76
The 1954 legislative history never mentions the look-back periods of Section
651 1(b)(2).
Under the 1954 statute, the three-year look-back provision of Section
651 1(b)(2)(A) was superfluous: the three-year period for filing a refund claim
in Section 6511(a) ran from a fixed, immovable date, and there was therefore no
need to specify in Section 651 1(b)(2)(A) the particular tax payments that were

171. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 169(a), 56 Stat. 798, 876; H.R. REP. No.
77-2333, at 118-19 (1942) ("Under section 322(b) as so amended, the amount of the
refund will be measured ...
by those payments for which the claim could be filed...
under the provisions of paragraph (1) if there were no later payments."), reprintedin
1942-2 C.B. 372, 460; see also 2 Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the S. Comm. on

Finance, 77th Cong. 1758-59 (1942) (statement of Albert L. Hopkins, Esq.) ("The
proposed amendment [to Section 322(b)(2)] is an attempt to limit the amount of the
refund to the amount of taxes paid within the time limit of each kind of claim.").
172. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 6511, 68A Stat. 3, 808. As
part of the restructuring of the Code that took place in 1954, Congress made the
limitations provision that previously had applied to income taxes applicable as well to
estate and gift taxes. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A415 (1954).
173. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A415 (1954).
174. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at A415 (1954).
175. See S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 586 (1954).
176. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 6511(a), (b), 68A Stat. 3, 808.
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recoverable. 77 That is, a look-back provision is necessary only if the event that
triggers the limitations period for filing a claim for refund under Section 6511 (a)
is within the taxpayer's control. In contrast, a look-back period is unnecessary
if the event that triggers the limitations period is fixed, such as the due date of
the return. Therefore, only the two-year look-back period of the 1954 version
of Section 6511(b)(2) served a purpose, and that purpose was the same one
served by its first ancestor in 1924: to clarify that a late payment of a portion
of
178
the tax due did not extend the statute of limitations for the entire tax.
f. Technical Amendments Act of 1958: Back to the Future
Sections 6511(a) and 6511(b)(2) were last amended in 1958. The 1958
legislation amended Section 651 l(a) to provide that a claim for refund must be
filed within three years from the time the return wasfiled or within two years
from the time the tax was paid, which was the rule enacted in 1934 and
inexplicably changed in 1954 as described above. 179 At the same time, Congress
amended the look-back rule of Section 6511(b)(2)(A) to provide that, if the
claim for refund is timely under the three-year period in Section 6511 (a), then
the amount of tax recoverable is the portion of the tax paid during the period
preceding the taxpayer's filing of the claim equal to three years plus the period
ofany extension of timeforfiling the return thatthe taxpayer obtained.'
The 1958 amendments extended the three-year look-back period of Section
6511(b)(2)(A) so that a taxpayer who timely files a return pursuant to an
extension of time for filing is not precluded from recovering a tax overpayment
when the taxpayer files a timely claim for refund. Without the extension of the
three-year look-back, a taxpayer who files a timely claim for refund within three
years after filing a timely return, but more than three years after paying the tax,
would be barred from recovery. This could occur, for example, if the taxpayer

177. At least one commentator perceived this same lack of purpose served by the
1954 version of Section 651 1(b)(2)(A):

[The look-back period of former Section 322(b)(2)] had the two-fold purpose
of preventing a taxpayer from creating his own limitations periods by
(1)merely filing a delinquent retum, where no return had been filed, or (2) by
making a supplemental payment of tax after the expiration of the applicable
limitation period. The limitationsprovisions of the 1954 Code would seem
to be limited to the lattersituation,however, since the threeyear limitation
periodunder the new Code is gearedto the date the return is requiredto be
filed ratherthan the date,it was actuallyfiled.
Stark, supranote 152, at 506 (emphasis added).
178. See supranotes 158-62 and accompanying text.
179. See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 82, 72 Stat. 1606, 1663; supra
notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
180. See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 82, 72 Stat. 1606, 1663. See
generally S.REP. No. 85-1983, at 98-99 (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 922, 1019-20.
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(1) is deemed to have paid tax on April 15 of year 1,1 (2) files a return on
August 15 of year 1 pursuant to an extension of time to file,'8 2 and (3) files a
timely claim for refund on June 1 of year 4.
g. Conclusions Dictated by the Legislative History
Throughout the history of Section 6511, Congress consistently has
expressed one clear concern: that the period within which a taxpayer can file a
claim for refund be consistent with (or at least no more favorable than) the
period within which the government can assess tax. The two-year look-back rule
of Section 6511(b)(2)(B), first enacted in 1924,"' is in one sense merely a
manifestation of Congress's principal objective. If a taxpayer were permitted to
make an additional tax payment after the period of limitations on assessment had
expired and thereby recover tax paid many years earlier, the Service would be
at a disadvantage because it has no similar mechanism for unilaterally opening
a closed tax year. The two-year look-back period of Section 6511(b)(2)(B)
clarifies that the only portions of a tax overpayment that are recoverable under
the two-year-from-payment rule of Section 651 l(a) are those portions for which
the claim for refund is timely filed.
Congress has never directly explained the purpose of the three-year lookback period of Section 6511(b)(2)(A). This provision first appeared as a
"clerical change" in 1934.84 The reason for its enactment, however, is readily
apparent: without it, a taxpayer effectively could create her own limitations
period for filing a refund claim by filing a late return that also constitutes a claim
for refund. It is hard to disagree with the proposition that taxpayers should not
have an unlimited period within which to file a claim for refund. Nevertheless,
the provision's effect puts it at odds with Congress's desire to treat taxpayers and
the government in a similar manner. Although taxpayers can file a claim for
refund and the government can assess tax within three years after the taxpayer
files the return,'8 5 the government, unlike taxpayers, is not subject to a limit on
the amount of tax it can recover.

181. See I.R.C. § 6513(b) (1994); supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
182. See I.R.C. § 6081(a) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-4 (as amended in 1996)
(automatic four-month extension for individuals).
183. See supranotes 158-62 and accompanying text.
184. See supranotes 163-69 and accompanying text.

185. See I.R.C. §§ 6501(a), 6511 (a) (1994).
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IV. THE PRE-1997 DISPUTE REGARDING WHETHER THE LIMITATIONS
PERIODS FOR FILING CLAIMS FOR TAX REFUNDS COULD BE
EQUITABLY TOLLED
Before the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Irwin v. Department of
36
Veterans Affairs,"
the lower federal courts routinely held that the limitations
periods that apply to claims for tax refunds under Sections 6511(a) and
651 l(b)'87 were not subject to equitable modification.'83 After Irwin, several
taxpayers requested relief from these limitations periods under the doctrine of
equitable tolling, and the lower federal courts divided on the question. In 1997,
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Brockamp 8 9 settled the issue.
This Part discusses the various approaches to the issue that the lower federal
courts took before the Supreme Court's decision in Brockamp, and then
discusses the Brockamp decision."O

186. 498 U.S. 89 (1990); see supranotes 69-78 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 613 F.2d 518, 527 (5th
Cir. 1980); Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1976); Estate of
Cowan v. Dep't of the Treasury, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9454, at 87,312 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Stepka v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 184, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Ellis v. United
States, 229 Ct. Cl. 814, 815 (1982).
The courts have permitted refund actions to proceed despite the taxpayer's late
filing of a claim for refund in several cases involving Native Americans. See, e.g.,
Harrington v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9215, at 82,860 (N.D. Okla.
1970); Daney v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 533, 535 (D. Kan. 1965), aff'd on other
grounds, 370 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1966); Nash v. Wiseman, 227 F. Supp. 552, 555-56
(W.D. Okla. 1963); Dodge v. United States, 362 F.2d 810, 814-15 (Ct. Cl. 1966). These
cases emphasize the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the federal government
and Native Americans, and therefore represent a unique exception to the general refusal
of courts to toll or otherwise modify the limitations periods of Section 6511. With
respect to the fiduciary nature of the government-Native American relationship, see Ellen
P. Aprill, TribalBonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process,46 ADMIN.

L. REv. 333, 334 & n.7 (1994). For general background that is helpful in understanding
the terminology used in these cases, see D. Faith Orlowski & Robbie Emery Burke,
Oklahoma Indian Titles, 29 TULSA L.J. 361 (1993).
189. 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
190. For other works that address the pre-1997 conflict in the lower federal courts,
see Malcolm L. Morris, Troubled Taxpayers' Tolling Troubles, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV.
121, 130-44 (1996); Richard M. Gaal, Comment, Equitable Tolling ofInternalRevenue
Code Section 6511: Bridging the Divide Between Rules andEquity, 27 CUMB. L. REV.
297, 303-22 (1996); Andrea Sharetta, Note, The Problem ofEquitable Tolling in Tax

Refund Claims, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 545,577-86 (1997); Matthew L. Weidner, Note,
A Webb of Confusion: Equitable Tolling in Tax Refund Suits, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1571, 1583-1608 (1996).
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A. The Pre-BrockampSplit in the Lower FederalCourts

Between the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Irwin and its 1997 decision
in Brockamp, several courts addressed whether the limitations periods of
Sections 65 11(a) and 651 1(b) could be equitably tolled. These decisions fall into
three general groups: (1) those concluding that the limitations periods of
Sections 6511(a) and 6511(b) could not be tolled under any circumstances,
(2) those assuming or holding that the periods could be tolled but concluding that
the facts did not warrant tolling, and (3) those holding that the periods could be
tolled and concluding either that the facts warranted relief or that further
factfinding was required.

1. Courts Concluding that Tolling is Impermissible
The Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Eleventh, and Federal
Circuits, 9" as well as a number of federal district courts, concluded that courts
could not equitably toll the limitations periods of Sections 6511 (a) and 6511 (b)
under any circumstances. These courts reached this conclusion by three separate
paths.
a. Courts that Failed to Consider the Irwin Analysis
The Eleventh and Federal Circuits," as well as several district courts, 93
appeared not to recognize Irwin's mandate that, with respect to claims against
the government, courts must analyze the specific limitations period to determine
whether Congress intended that it not be subject to tolling. The Eleventh Circuit
briefly referred to Irwin in a footnote"94 and the Federal Circuit failed to mention
the case at all. Instead, these courts concluded that the limitations periods of
Sections 65 l(a) and 6511(b)(2) could not be tolled because to do so would be
contrary to United States v. Dalm.9 5 As explained below, however, Dalm does

191. See Lovett v. United States, 81 F.3d 143 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
933 (1996); Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1148 (1997); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1050 (1994); Vintilla v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444 (1lth Cir. 1991).
192. See Lovett, 81 F.3d at 143; Vintilla, 931 F.2d at 1444.
193. See, e.g., Tanzola v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 95-CV-4408, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20,222 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 1996); Katz v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 24, 28 (D.
Conn. 1995); Kishnani v. United States, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,115, at 87,441
(E.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Joosten v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,393,
at 85,300 (D.N.J. 1996) (discussing Irwin at length and concluding that its analysis does
not apply to claims for tax refunds).
194. See Vintilla, 931 F.2d at 1447 n.1.
195. 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
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not address equitable tolling, but rather the separate doctrine of equitable
recoupment.
In Dalm, the taxpayer paid gift tax on amounts received in 1976 and,
following an audit, the Service asserted an income tax deficiency with respect
to the same funds. 96 The taxpayer challenged the income tax deficiency in the
Tax Court and, as part of a pre-trial settlement with the government, paid onehalf of the income tax that the Service claimed was due. 97 Immediately
following the settlement and dismissal of the Tax Court proceeding, which
occurred in 1984, the taxpayer filed a claim for refund of the gift tax she had
paid in 1976.98 After the Service failed to act upon the claim within six months,
the taxpayer brought an action for a refund in federal district court. 199
The taxpayer argued that the doctrine of equitable recoupment allowed the
court to consider her claim2 notwithstanding that the refund claim was untimely
under Section 6511(a) and that the court seemingly was barred from hearing the
claim by Section 7422(a). In general, the doctrine of equitable recoupment
permits a taxpayer to "recoup" (i.e., recover) tax paid in certain situations where
the same transaction has been taxed under two inconsistent theories.2"' Although
the taxpayer's 1976 receipt of funds in Dalm had been subject to two
inconsistent taxes (both income and gift taxes), the Supreme Court held that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to hear her claim.20 2 In its previous decisions
involving equitable recoupment, the Court explained, the trial court had always
had jurisdiction to hear the taxpayer's claim with respect to one of the taxes
involved because the refund claim with respect to that tax had been timely filed.
In that situation, according to the Court, the trial court can exercise its equitable
power to consider the entire transaction and permit the taxpayer to recover a tax
that was not properly due, even if recovery of that tax technically is barred by the

196. See id. at 599.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 599-600.
199. See id. at 600.
200. See id.
201. See, e.g., Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935). Bull involved facts very
similar to those of Dalm. In Bull, the taxpayer paid estate tax on amounts received and,
once the statute of limitations on filing a claim for refund of the estate tax had expired,
was required to pay income tax on the same receipts. The taxpayer filed a timely claim
for refund of the income tax and argued in the alternative that, if the income tax was
properly due, then the taxpayer should be allowed to recoup the estate tax previously paid
by offsetting it against the income tax. The Supreme Court held that the income tax was
properly due and that the estate tax should not have been paid. The Court accepted the

taxpayer's alternative argument and-in a discretionary exercise of its equitable
powers-permitted the taxpayer to offset the estate tax previously paid against the
income tax due even though the taxpayer technically was barred by the statute of
limitations from recovering the estate tax.
202. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1990).
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statute of limitations.2

3

In contrast, the taxpayer's refund claim in Dalm was

untimely. The doctrine of equitable recoupment, the Court held, could not
remedy this defect, i.e., the doctrine does not provide an independent basis for
the district court's jurisdiction to hear the claim.
The Eleventh and Federal Circuits construed Dalm as precluding equitable
tolling in tax refund cases. This reading is not wholly unreasonable because the
Dalm opinion contains fairly strong language regarding the importance of
statutes of limitations in the scheme of federal taxation.2 Further, Justice
Stevens, in a scathing dissent in Dalm, characterized the "ultimate question" in
the case as "whether a statute of limitations otherwise barring a refund of federal
income tax is tolled by Government [mis]conduct. ' 20 Nevertheless, the fact
remains that the taxpayer in Dalm never argued that the statute should be
equitably tolled and the Court never addressed the question. 6
b. The Fourth Circuit's Approach: Irwin's Presumption
of Tolling Does Not Apply
In contrast to the Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Federal Circuits,
the Fourth Circuit in Webb v. United State20 7 acknowledged the relevance of the
Supreme Court's decision in Irwin to the question whether the limitations
periods in Sections 6511(a) and 6511(b) are subject to tolling. The Fourth
Circuit interpreted Irwin, however, as establishing a rebuttable presumption of
tolling in actions against the government only when a comparable claim is
available against private parties.20 8 Because a plaintiff can assert a claim for
refund of tax against only the government, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, Irwin's
holding does not apply.2' As discussed earlier,210 this interpretation of Irwin is

203. See id. at611.

204. For example, the Court stated that, "[r]ead together, the import of [the
statutory provisions] is clear: unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the
time limits imposed by § 651 1(a), a suit for refund, regardless of whether the tax is
alleged to have been 'erroneously,' 'illegally,' or 'wrongfully collected,' . . . may not be

maintained in any court." Id. at 602.
205. Id. at 612 (emphasis added).
206. It is unclear why the taxpayer in Dalm did not expressly raise the equitable
tolling issue. Although the parties' briefs and the Court's opinion provide no definitive

answer, it is possible that the limitations period for seeking a refund of the gift tax had
not yet expired when the Service first began to question whether the taxpayer's 1976
receipt should be subject to income tax. If so, then the taxpayer in Dalm should have
filed a protective claim for refund of the gift tax within the period prescribed by Section

6511(a). If this was the case, then the taxpayer's counsel may have chosen not to argue
that the statute should be tolled, knowing that the Court likely would not be receptive to
the argument given the taxpayer's missed opportunity to file a timely claim.
207. 66 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997).
208. See id. at 697.
209. See id. at 698; see also Murphy v. United States, No. 9J-2006, 1996 U.S. App.
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flawed and therefore should not form the basis for holding that the limitations
" '
periods in Sections 6511(a) and 6511(b) cannot be tolled.21
c. The First Circuit's Approach: The Irwin Analysis Applies, But Congress
Did Not Intend for the Periods in Section 6511 to Be Tolled
In Oropallov. United States,212 a panel of the First Circuit that included
then-Circuit Judge Breyer, the author of the Supreme Court's later opinion in
United States v. Brockamp,2 3 also concluded that courts cannot toll the
limitations periods on filing claims for tax refunds. The plaintiff in Oropallo
claimed that the effects of carbon monoxide poisoning and other factors had
prevented him from filing his 1983 return, on which he claimed a refund, until
1990. The court assumed for the sake of argument that the taxpayer's claim for
refund was timely under Section 6511(a) (the majority view on this issue), 214 so
that the bar to recovery was Section 651 1(b)(2)(A). The First Circuit concluded
that, under Irwin, the limitations periods of Section 6511 are presumed to be
subject to tolling. The court further concluded, however, that the way in which
Congress had structured the limitations periods in Sections 651 l(a) and 651 l(b)
indicated that tolling was inappropriate. In support of this proposition, the First
Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf,Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis
& Petigrow v. Gilbertson.21
In Lampf,the Court addressed what statute of limitations applies in actions
based on misrepresentations that violate Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10(b)-5.2" 6 The Court held that a uniform federal statute of

LEXIS 1176 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 1996) (unpublished opinion in which Fourth Circuit
adhered to its holding in Webb). In Webb, the Fourth Circuit held in the alternative that,

assuming Irwin's rebuttable presumption of tolling applies, Congress had indicated that
tolling of the refund limitations provisions was inappropriate for the reasons stated by the
First Circuit in Oropallov. UnitedStates, 994 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied,510
U.S. 1050 (1994). See Webb, 66 F.3d at 699; infra notes 212-26 and accompanying text
(discussing Oropallo).
210. See supranotes 83-86 and accompanying text.
211. The government's brief in Webb did not advocate the reading of Irwin that the

Fourth Circuit adopted.
212. 994 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994).
213. 519 U.S. 347 (1997); see infra Part IV.B.
214. See supra notes 117-51 and accompanying text (discussing majority and
minority views on whether a late return triggers a three-year period for filing a claim for
refund).
215. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
216. See generally id. A plaintiff's right to bring an action under Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 is an implied right of action, i.e., the right to bring an action
is not explicit in the statute, but has been inferred by the courts. See generally Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 n.10 (1983). Accordingly, the statute
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limitations should apply, and selected the "one-and-three year" statute of
limitations that appears, in various forms, in sections of the 1934 Act and of the
Securities Act of 1933.37 In general, these statutes of limitations provide that
actions must be brought within one year after discovery of the facts constituting
the alleged violation and within three years after the violation occurred." 8
Because the plaintiffs in Lampfhad met neither the one nor the three-year period,
the Court considered whether the limitations periods could be equitably tolled.
The Court held that tolling was impermissible. The one-year period, the Court
reasoned, "begins after discovery of the facts constituting the violation, making
tolling unnecessary. 219 The three-year period, the Court stated, was designed
"to serve as a cutoff" and therefore could not be tolled." ° In other words,
Congress already had provided for tolling in the statute and had set an outside
limit, rendering any further equitable tolling of the statute contrary to
congressional intent. 1
The First Circuit in Oropalloreasoned that the structure of Sections 65 11(a)
and 6511(b) is analogous to the one-and-three year structure of the statute in
Lampfm' That is, under the majority view of Section 651 1(a),2 the filing of a
late return can at any time trigger a three-year period for filing a claim for
refund. In this sense, the filing of a return is analogous to "discovery" of a cause
of action, which under the statute in Lampf can at any time trigger a one-year
period for bringing an action. Section 6511(b)(2)(A), the First Circuit reasoned,
provides that recovery of tax is limited to the amount of tax paid within the
three-years preceding the filing of the refund claim, and therefore is analogous
to the three-year period in Lampfbecause it serves as an absolute, outside limit

itself provides no guidance on what limitations period governs actions brought under
Section 10(b).
217. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 354-55.
218. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1994).
219. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
220. Id.
221. The Court's decision in Lampf has been the subject of a great deal of
criticism. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 32, at 612-13 (arguing that "the Court's
understanding of equitable tolling is deeply flawed" and that "Lampfis not the showstopping decision it first appears to be"); Leslie, supranote 18, at 1588 ("After Lampf,
as long as the Ponzi operator can keep the pyramid standing for three years without
selling additional fraudulent securities, she is not accountable to her victims. So while
Charles Ponzi invented his illegal scheme in 1919, the Court perfected it in 1991.").
Congress initially appeared prepared to change the result in Lampfby statute, but
ultimately overturned only the Court's retroactive application of its holding to all
pending cases. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994) (new Section 27A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (holding
portion of new provision unconstitutional); Leslie, supra note 18, at 1608-10 (discussing
congressional response to Lampf).
222. See Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1993).
223. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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on a taxpayer's ability to recover. Given that Section 6511(b)(2)(A) is an
outside limit, the court held, to toll that provision would, as in Lampf, be
contrary to congressional intent. 4
The First Circuit's analysis in Oropallo is questionable because, in contrast
to the statute in Lampf Sections 6511(a) and 6511(b)(2) do not constitute a
discovery period combined with a statute of repose.'
Sections 6511(a) and
6511(b)(2)(B) essentially work together to establish a three-year statute of
limitations, measured from the earlier of the date the taxpayer filed the return or
the date the taxpayer paid the tax. In contrast to the three-year period in Lampf
there is no indication that Congress intended Section 651 l(b)(2)(B) to serve as
an absolute, outside limit
for taxpayers who have failed to discover their
6
entitlement to a refund. 1
2. Courts Assuming or Holding that Tolling is Permissible,
But Concluding that the Facts Did Not Warrant Relief
The Courts of Appeals for the Eighth 7 and the Tenth Circuits, 8 along
with several district courts," 9 assumed without deciding that the Irwin

224. See Oropallo,994 F.2d at 31.
225. A statute of repose is "an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer
exists and is not tolled for any reason because to do so would upset the economic balance
struck by the legislative body." First United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum
Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
226. In contrast to Section 6511, the statute that the Court interpreted in Lampf
expressly contemplates that a plaintiff will be barred from bringing an action more than
three years after an alleged violation occurred, even if the plaintiff has not discovered her
cause of action at that point. The legislative history of that statute reinforces the
conclusion that foreclosing claims despite a plaintiff's lack of knowledge was an explicit
legislative choice. See 78 CONG. REc. 8198 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher); 78
CONG. REC. 8200 (1934) (statement of Sen. Barkley).
227. See Git v. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 9J-1 899, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 86 (8th
Cir. Jan. 4, 1996).
228. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472 (10th Cir.
1996). The Tenth Circuit appears to base its holding on the absence of a sufficient
factual justification for tolling, as if tolling were possible in appropriate circumstances,
but then suggests that tolling the three-year look-back period of Section 6511 (b)(2)(A)
would be inappropriate because the provision is a statute of repose. Because the court
appears to rely primarily on the absence of compelling facts, it seems appropriate to place
it in the category of cases that did not reach a firm conclusion on whether tolling is
permissible in tax refund actions.
229. See, e.g., Hannahs v. United States, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,111
(W.D. Tenn. 1995); Henderson v. Backaric, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,329 (D. Kan.
1995); Roman v. United States, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,591 (N.D. Cal. 1995);
Brennan v. United States, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,247 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Hofnan
v. United States, No. 93-6091-10, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,422 (D. Or. June 14, 1994);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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presumption of tolling applies to the limitations periods for filing claims for tax
refunds, but concluded that, even if tolling is permissible, the facts did not
warrant tolling. Similarly, some courts held that the Irwin presumption applies
to these limitations periods, yet concluded that tolling was not warranted under
the circumstances. 0 The taxpayers in these cases offered a wide variety of
justifications for their failures to file timely claims for refund. In general, the
courts rejected the taxpayers' requests for equitable tolling on the ground that the
taxpayers had not offered sufficient evidence of an impediment that prevented
them from filing a timely claim. For example, the courts rejected taxpayer
claims that mental incompetence or poor health prevented timely filing, either
because of inadequate evidence of the alleged conditione' or because a
conservator had been appointed who could have filed a timely claim. 2
Similarly, the courts rejected claims that incarceration prevented timely filing 3

and that timely filing was impossible because the taxpayer realized his error in
including an item in gross income only when a court issued a favorable decision
on the issue to another taxpayer, at which point the limitations period for the
taxpayer's claim already had expired. 4

Willis v. Dep't of the Treasury, 848 F. Supp. 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
230. See, e.g., Barker v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,421 (S.D.
Cal. 1996).
231. See, e.g., Git, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS at 49; Roman, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCII) at 89,961; Brennan, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 84,025.
232. See Hofinan, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 11,422; see also S. Cal. First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Cal. 1969) (pre-Irwincase denying
equitable relief because conservator could have filed a claim for refund within the
limitations period).
233. See Henderson, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 89,016; see also Williams v.
United States, 715 F. Supp. 272, 275 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (pre-Irwin case reaching same
result).
234. See Barker,96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 85,407. Two other cases presented
facts almost identical to those of Barker,but the courts never considered whether the
taxpayer's delayed discovery of favorable precedent was a sufficient justification for
tolling because they concluded that the limitations periods in Sections 6511(a) and
651 l(b) cannot be tolled under any circumstances. See Lovett v. United States, 81 F.3d
143 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Tanzola v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 95-CV-4408, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20,222 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 1996); supra notes 192-206 and accompanying

text (discussing these cases); see also Bramble v. Internal Revenue Serv., 82-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9380 (E.D.N.Y 1982) (pre-Irwin case in which taxpayer argued
unsuccessfully that limitations period did not begin to run until taxpayer discovered
subsequent favorable precedent); Canton v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Minn.
1967), aff'dper curiam, 388 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1968) (same).
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3. Courts Holding that Tolling is Permissible and Concluding
Either that the Facts Warranted Relief or that Further
Factfinding was Required
Research has revealed seven post-Irwin cases in which the courts both held
that the limitations periods of Sections 6511 (a) and 6511(b) can be tolled and
concluded either that the taxpayer had established circumstances that warranted
tolling or that the taxpayer might be able to do so at trial. One of these cases is
an unreported opinion that gives few details as to the reason for tolling. 5 In a
second case, the court concluded with virtually no analysis that the three-year

limitations period of Section 6511(a) did not begin to run until the taxpayer
realized that amounts he had received several years earlier might be
6

characterized as disability payments that were excludable from gross income.2
The holding of this second case is contrary to that of other courts that have
considered similar taxpayer arguments 7 and ultimately was reversed on
appeal. 8 In each of the remaining five cases, the taxpayers asserted that mental
incompetence prevented them from filing timely claims for refund.
Of the five cases in which the taxpayers asserted mental incompetence, in
only two-Scott v. UnitedStates23 9 and FirstInterstateBank ofNevada v. United
States24°-did the court enter judgment for the taxpayer and order a refund. In
both cases the taxpayers themselves or a relative had made overpayments of
income tax by making excessive estimated tax payments.24 Similarly, in both
235. See Johnson v. United States, No. 88-NC-1096, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16,976 (D. Utah Oct. 22, 1992) (stating that "[p]laintiff's delays were a result of seeking
redress through Internal Revenue Service administrative procedures. All statutory time
periods which may have acted as a bar to Plaintiff's refund were tolled as a result of
ongoing communications, meetings, and conferences between Plaintiff and Defendants
regarding the tax refunds.").
236. See Neilsen v. United States, No. 6-91-3619-RFP, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13,536 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 1992).
237. See Murphy v. United States, No. 95-2006, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1176 (4th
Cir. Jan. 30, 1996); Robertson v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,529 (D.
Colo. 1992); see also Lovett v. United States, 81 F.3d 143 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Barker v.
United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,421 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Tanzola, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS at 20,222; supra notes 192-211 and accompanying text (discussing these
other cases).
238. See Neilsen v. United States, No. 92-C-2597, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3216
(9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1994).
239. 847 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Haw. 1993), aff'd, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,557
(9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
240. 874 F. Supp. 286 (D. Nev. 1994), rev'd, 108 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1997)
(reversing in light of Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S.
347 (1997), discussed infra part IV.B).
241. See Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1500 (father and taxpayer made estimated tax
payments); First Interstate Bank, 874 F. Supp. at 290 (son made estimated tax
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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cases the taxpayers failed to file income tax returns claiming a refund until many
years after the tax years in issue. 2 In Scott, the court concluded after trial,
based largely on the consistent testimony of both the taxpayer's and the
government's expert witnesses, that the taxpayer's severe alcoholism had
rendered him incompetent and unable to file a timely claim for refund, and that
the limitations periods of Section 6511 were tolled during the taxpayer's period
of incapacity. 243 In FirstInterstateBank, a refund action brought by the executor
of the taxpayer's estate, the court concluded that the taxpayer had established
through affidavits of doctors and nurses that she suffered from senile dementia
that rendered her unable to file a timely claim for refund and accordingly granted
the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment.2" The district court's decision in
Scott was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit 5 but ultimately reversed by the
Supreme Court on the ground that the limitations periods of Section 6511 are not
subject to equitable tolling.2' The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the
district court's decision in FirstInterstateBank in light of the Supreme Court's
reversal of Scott.247
The remaining three cases in which the taxpayers requested tolling based
on their mental incompetence are Johnsen v. United States,248 Wiltgen v. United
States, 49 and Brockamp v. United States'Y0 In each case the taxpayers remitted
funds to the Internal Revenue Service z s' that exceeded their income tax liability
for the year and, like the taxpayers in Scott and FirstInterstateBank, failed to
file returns claiming refunds until many years later. In both Johnsen and

payments); supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text (discussing tax overpayments and
estimated tax payments).
242. See Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1500; FirstInterstateBank, 874 F. Supp. at 287.
The facts in each case are essentially the same as those in example three, discussed supra
text accompanying notes 117-51.
243. See Scott, 847 F. Supp. at 1507-08.
244. See FirstInterstateBank, 874 F. Supp. at 291.
245. See Scott v. United States, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,557 (9th Cir.
1995).
246. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 354 (1997) (reversing two
Ninth Circuit decisions, including Scott); infra Part IV.B.
247. See First Interstate Bank of Nev. v. United States, 108 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir.
1997).
248. 758 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
249. 813 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Iowa 1992).
250. 859 F. Supp. 1283 (C.D. Cal. 1994), rev'd, 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd,
519 U.S. 347 (1997).
251. In Johnsen, the taxpayer apparently made estimated tax payments. See
Johnsen, 758 F. Supp. at 836. In Wiltgen, the taxpayer remitted several payments to the
Internal Revenue Service without specifying their purpose. See Wiltgen, 813 F. Supp.
at 1388-89. In Brockamp, the taxpayer enclosed a payment with IRS Form 4868, the

form used to request an automatic extension of time to file an income tax return. See
Brockamp, 859 F. Supp. at 1284.
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Wiltgen, the taxpayer had been declared incompetent after making the payments
in question and a court-appointed conservator filed a late return claiming a
refund."2 In each of these two cases the district court denied the government's
motion to dismiss on the ground that the taxpayer's mental incompetence, if
proved, could form the basis for tolling the relevant limitations period.
Following the district court's denial of the government's motion, the taxpayers
in Johnsen and Wiltgen apparently reached a settlement with the government, as
there are no further proceedings reported in connection with these cases. In
Brockamp, the taxpayer had not been declared incompetent, but the administrator
of the taxpayer's estate asserted that the taxpayer's senility had prevented the
taxpayer from filing a timely claim for refund. 3 The district court in Brockamp
granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the
limitations periods of Sections 6511(a) and 6511(b) could not be tolled under
any circumstances.2 4 The Ninth Circuit, however, based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Irwin, reversed. 5 As discussed below, the government
successfully'sought the Supreme Court's review of the Ninth Circuit's decisions
in both Brockamp and Scott.
B. The Supreme Court Settles the Issue
In United States v. Brockamp," 6 the Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth
Circuit's decisions in both Brockamp257 and Scott, 8 discussed above.2 59 In each
case, the Ninth Circuit had held that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision
in Irwin v. Departmentof Veterans Affairs,260 the limitations periods on filing
claims for tax refunds in Section 6511 are presumed to be subject to equitable
tolling in appropriate circumstances, and that neither the statutory language nor
legislative history of Section 6511 indicate that Congress intended to preclude
tolling. The Supreme Court reversed.
The preliminary issue that the Court faced was the scope of its prior
decision in Irwin. As discussed earlier, some courts read Irwin as holding that,
to receive the benefit of tolling in connection with a claim against the
government, a claimant must first establish both that the same, or at least a
similar claim, could be asserted against a private party and that tolling would be

252. See Johnsen, 758 F. Supp. at 835-36; Wiltgen, 813 F. Supp. at 1389, 1395.
253. See Brockamp, 859 F. Supp. at 1285, 1287.
254. See id. at 1289.

255.
256.
257.
258.

See Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995).
519 U.S. 347 (1997).
Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 260.
Scott v. United States, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 150,557 (9th Cir. 1995).

259. See supra notes 239-55 and accompanying text.
260. 498 U.S. 89 (1990); see supranotes 69-78 and accompanying text (discussing
the
Irwin
decision).
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available in such a private action.26 Although this reading is contrary to the
language and rationale of the Irwin decision, 262 the Court in Brockamp suggested

that this reading is correct. It characterized Irwin as holding that equitable
tolling applies to Title VII suits against the government in the same way that it
applies to Title VII suits against private employers,' 63 and then stated that it was
"willing to assume, favorably to the taxpayers but only for argument's sake, that
a tax refund suit and a private suit for restitution are sufficiently similar to
warrant asking Irwin's negatively phrased question: Is there good reason 2to
believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply?"
The Court thus assumed that the Irwin presumption of tolling applied. The
question then became whether there was evidence that Congress intended to
preclude tolling.
The Court in Brockamp unanimously concluded that Congress did not
intend to permit equitable tolling of the Section 6511 limitations periods. The
Court advanced two main reasons for its conclusion. First, Section 6511 sets
forth the limitations on claims for refund in a complex manner that "cannot
'
easily be read as containing implicit exceptions."265
The Court emphasized that
Sections 651 (a) and 6511(b) are intricate provisions that impose limits both on
the time within which a claim must be filed and on the amount of tax that a
taxpayer may recover.'" Further, Sections 6511(a) and 6511(b) are part of a
larger, complex scheme:
Congress has enacted specific exceptions to the general
limitations periods267 and has created a mechanism for the government to recover

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See supranotes 83-86 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 83-86 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 349 (1997).
Id. at 350.
Id.
See id. at 350-52.
Section 651 l(d) sets forth special limitations periods that apply in several

specific situations. For example, Section 651 1(d)(1) provides that the limitations period
in Section 6511 (a) for filing a claim for refund based on a deduction for a bad debt under
Code Section 166 or for a loss from a worthless security under Section 165(g) is seven
years from the due date of the taxpayer's return, and that the taxpayer can recover tax
paid outside the look-back periods prescribed in Section 651 l(b)(2) to the extent of the
amount of the overpayment attributable to these two deductions. See I.R.C. § 6511(d)(1)
(1994); infranote 358 (discussing rationale for rule of Section 651 l(d)(1)).
In addition, in Sections 1311 through 1314 of the Code, commonly known as the

mitigation provisions, Congress has delineated specific circumstances in which taxpayers
can obtain refunds and the government can assess tax outside the normal limitations
periods that apply to claims for refund and assessments. Generally, the mitigation
provisions attempt to prevent inequitable results in certain narrowly enumerated
situations for either the taxpayer or the government due to the expiration of the relevant
limitations periods. For example, if a taxpayer has included an amount in gross income
for a specific year and, after the limitations period for claiming a refund with respect to
that year has expired, the Service successfully asserts in court that the taxpayer must
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refunds made to a taxpayer who has not filed a timely refund claim." 8 "Section
6511's detail, its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both
procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken
together, indicate to us that Congress did not intend courts to read other
unmentioned, open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the statute that it wrote."'269
Second, given the large number of returns filed and refunds claimed each
year, to hold that the limitations periods of Section 6511 contain implicit
equitable exceptions could create serious administrative problems for the
Service. At the least, the Court suggested, the potential magnitude of these
administrative problems "tells us that Congress would likely have wanted to
decide explicitly whether, or just where and when, to expand the statute's
limitations periods, rather than delegate to the courts a generalized power to do
27 As discussed in Part
so wherever a court concludes that equity so requires.""
V, Congress did just that.
V. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE DISPUTE:
NEW SECTION 6511 (h) OF THE CODE

A. The Callfor a Legislative Solution and the FirstProposals
27
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in UnitedStates V.Brockamp, '
the highly publicized decisions of the courts of appeals on the tolling issue?7 led
to the call for a legislative solution. Simultaneously with the Solicitor General's

include the amount in gross income for a later year, the taxpayer will be entitled to a
refund that compensates for the taxpayer's double inclusion of the amount in gross
income. See I.R.C. §§ 131 1(a), 1312(1), 1313(a)(1), 1314(b) (1994). See generally John
A. Lynch, Jr., Income Tax Statute ofLimitations: Sixty Years of Mitigation-Enough,
Already!!, 51 S.C. L. REv. 62, 68-78 (1999) (discussing mitigation provisions); Camilla
E. Watson, Equitable Recoupment: Revisiting an Old and Inconsistent Remedy, 65
FoRDHAM L. REv. 691, 749-52 (1996) (same).
268. See I.R.C. §§ 6514(a), 7405(a) (1994); supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
269. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997).

270. Id. at 353.
271. 519 U.S. 347 (1997); see supraPart IV.B.
272. See supraPart IV.A. With respect to the publicity surrounding these cases,
see Interview with Melvin Lefkowitz, Former IRS District Counsel for Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 19, 1996) (government never should have let these cases progress to the Supreme
Court), TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 6, 1996 (Doc. No. 96-6370), available in LEXIS,
Fedtax library, TNT file; Robert G. Nath, Taxpayer Pleads "Drunk" to Statute of
Limitations-andWins!, 62 TAX NOTES 1315 (Mar. 7, 1994); Leslie Berger, Woman's

Battle with IRS May Reach High Court; She Wants Refund of $7,000 Check Her Senile
Father Wrote to the Agency, Which FearsA Flood of Suits Citing Disabilities, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1996, at A13.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1

50

McGovern: McGovern: New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax Refunds:
TAXREFUNDS

2000]

request for a writ of certiorariin Brockamp, the Clinton Administration directed

the Treasury Department to craft a solution.27 3 Members of Congress also took
notice of the issue. In March 1996, Representative Jennifer Dunn, a member of
the House Ways and Means Committee, considered offering a legislative
proposal' as an amendment to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2,275 which was then
working its way through Congress. Representative Dunn's proposal would have
added to the Code a new Section 6511(h), which would have provided expressly
for the suspension of the limitations periods in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of
Section 6511 in certain cases. 6 Her proposal was identical in substance with
draft language produced by the Treasury Department. 7 Representative Dunn
never offered her proposal as a formal amendment, due in part to the projected
revenue loss associated with it."

273. A statement issued by the White House Office of the Press Secretary on
January 31, 1996, provides:
Today, the Solicitor General filed with the Supreme Court petitions for
certiorari in two Ninth Circuit cases interpreting the tax code's rules about
how long a taxpayer has to seek a refund for overpayment of taxes. The
President recognizes the necessity of applying the current law to pending
cases, and that is the position of the government in these two cases. In
reviewing the policies at issue in these cases, however, the President has
concluded that the law at times may produce harsh results.... Accordingly,
he has directed the Secretary of the Treasury promptly to make
recommendations to him concerning whether and how the law should be
changed to avoid such unfair results.
TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 1996 (Doc. No. 96-3438), available in LEXIS, Fedtax
library, TNT file.
274. See Ways-Means Approves Taxpayer Rights 2 Measure,Adds Intermediate
Sanctions, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 22, 1996, at G56, availablein LEXIS,
Legis library, Drexec file.
275. Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).
276. Section 6511(h), as set forth in Representative Dunn's proposal, would have
read:
(h) SUSPENSION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION ON FILING CLAIMS.-The running
of any period of time specified in subsection (a), (b), or (c) shall be suspended
for the period during which it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary
that(1) the taxpayer is incompetent (as determined by a court),
(2) the taxpayer is committed to a mental institution or hospital, or
(3) to the extent provided in regulations, the taxpayer suffers from

any debilitating physical or mental condition which prevents the
taxpayer from managing the taxpayer's financial affairs.
Dunn's EquitableTolling Amendment to Section 6511, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 6, 1997
(Doc. No. 97-3678), availablein LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file.
277. See Draft of Treasury's 1996 Equitable Tolling Proposal,TAX NOTES TODAY,
Feb. 6, 1997 (Doc. No. 97-3677), availablein LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file.
278. See Ways-Means Approves Taxpayer Rights, supranote 274, at G56 (stating
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These legislative proposals lay dormant until early 1997 when, as part of his
fiscal year 1998 budget, President Clinton proposed extending the period during
which taxpayers with serious disabilities could file claims for tax refunds.279
Although Congress enacted major tax legislation in 1997,280 the legislation did
not include a tolling provision. In late 1997, however, Congress incorporated a
tolling provision in the bill" that was later enacted as the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.282
B. New Code Section 6511(h)

1. The Statutory Language and Its Origin
As part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998,283 Congress added to the Code a new Section 6511(h) that provides as
follows:
(h) Running of periods of limitation suspended while taxpayer is
unable to manage financial affairs due to disability
(1) In general
In the case of an individual, the running of the periods specified
in subsections (a), (b), and (c) shall be suspended during any
period of such individual's life that such individual is financially
disabled.
(2) Financially disabled
(A) In general
For purposes of paragraph (1), an individual is financially
disabled if such individual is unable to manage his financial

that Dunn "opted to continue working with the administration in the hopes of finding an
acceptable solution that could be accommodated within budget constraints").
279. See Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1998, reprintedin
TAx NOTES TODAY, Feb. 7, 1997 (Doc. No. 97-3736), available in LEXIS, Fedtax
library, TNT file. The President also included the same proposal in his budget for fiscal
1999.

See

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE

ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS, reprintedin TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 3, 1998
(Doc. No. 98-4800), availablein LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file. By the time of the
fiscal 1999 budget proposal, however, the House of Representatives had already passed
a bill that included a tolling provision and the bill was under consideration in the Senate.
See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
280. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
281. See H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 322 (1997).
282. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685.
283. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685.
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affairs by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment of the individual which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months. An individual
shall not be considered to have such an impairment unless proof
of the existence thereof is furnished in such form and manner as
the Secretary may require.
(B) Exception where individual has guardian, etc.
An individual shall not be treated as financially disabled
during any period that such individual's spouse or any other
to act on behalf of such individual in
person is authorized
2
financial matters. 4
The legislative process produced no substantive changes to Section 6511(h).
The language and structure of Section 6511 (h) as enacted are virtually identical
to those of the version included in the original House Bill.28 5

284. I.R.C. § 6511(h) (Supp. IV 1998). The new tolling provision applies to all
claims for refund other than those that were barred by operation of law, including the
doctrine of resjudicata, as of July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(b), 112 Stat. 685, 741; 144 CONG.
REC. D831 (daily digest July 23, 1998) (legislation signed by the President on July 22,
1998). The period of disability that suspends the limitations periods can take place
before, on, or after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3202(b), 112 Stat. 685, 741. The effective
date provision precludes relief for taxpayers whose claims for refund were barred because
the periods of limitation in Sections 6511(a) or 6511(b) already had expired as of July
22, 1998.
285. The language proposed in Section 322 of the original House Bill was as
follows:
(h) RUNNING OF PERIODS OF LIMITATION SUSPENDED WHILE TAXPAYER IS
UNABLE TO MANAGE FINANCIAL AFFAIRS DUE TO DISABILITY.(1) IN GENERAL.-In the case of an individual, the running of the
periods specified in subsections (a), (b), and (c) shall be suspended during any
period of such individual's life that such individual is financially disabled.
(2) FINANCIALLY DISABLED(A) IN GENERAL.--For purposes of paragraph (1), an
individual is financially disabled if such individual is unable to
manage his financial affairs by reason of his medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. An
individual shall not be considered to have such an impairment
unless proof of the existence thereof is furnished in such form and
manner as the Secretary may require.
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The legislative history of Section 6511(h) is silent as to the origin of the
definition of "financially disabled. 28 6 It is clear, however, that Congress based
the statutory language on the definition in Section 22(e)(3) of "permanently and
' which is used for purposes of determining whether a
totally disabled,"287
taxpayer is entitled to the tax credit provided by Section 22.288 The language of
Section 22(e)(3) first appeared in the definition of "disabled" that Congress
enacted as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1956" 9 (and later amended
in 1965)0 for purposes of determining whether individuals are entitled to Social
Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits. Congress used the SSDI
language in 1958 for the definition of "disabled" in former Section 213(g)(3)29

(B)EXCEPTION WHERE INDIVIDUAL HAS GUARDIAN ETC.An individual shall not be treated as financially disabled during
any period that such individual's spouse or any other person is
authorized to act on behalf of such individual in financial matters.
H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 322 (1997).
286. The reports of the congressional committees that considered the provision do
not discuss the origin of its language. See H.R. REP. No. 105-364, pt. 1, at 68-69 (1997);
S. REP. No. 105-174, at 145 (1998); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 146-47 (1998).
287. Section 22(e)(3) provides:
PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY DEFINED.-An individual is permanently
and totally disabled if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
An individual shall not be considered to be permanently and totally disabled
unless he furnishes proof of the existence thereof in such form and manner,
and at such times, as the Secretary may require.
I.R.C. § 22(e)(3) (1994).
288. Section 22 provides a tax credit to those who either have attained age 65 or
are retired and, when they retired, were permanently and totally disabled. See I.R.C. §
22(a), (b) (1994). Congress made this credit available to those who are permanently and
totally disabled in the same year that it repealed former Section 105(d). See infra notes
293-94.
289. Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 807, 815 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994)). Congress used the same language, as amended in 1965,
see infranote 290, to create the definition of "disabled" used for purposes of determining
those who are eligible for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits. See Social
Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). For background
on the SSDI and SSI programs, see Lance Liebman, The Definition ofDisabilityin Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare
Estates, 89 HARv. L. REV. 833, 840, 855 (1976).
290. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 303(a), 79 Stat.
286, 366. With respect to the nature and effect of the 1965 amendment, see infra notes
313-17 and accompanying text.
291. See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 17(a), 72 Stat.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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and again in 1965 to define the same term in Section 72(m)(7). 29 2 In 1976,
Congress again looked to the SSDI definition, as amended in 1965, in enacting
the definition of "permanently and totally disabled" for purposes of former
Section 105(d)(4). 293 Finally, Congress incorporated the language of former
Section 105(d) verbatim when it enacted what is now Section 22(e)(3). 2 94 These

1606, 1613 (codified at I.R.C. § 213(g)(3) (repealed 1965)). Former Section 213(g)
increased the limit on an individual's ability to deduct medical expenses for those who
had attained the age of 65 and were disabled. See Van Lede v. Comm'r, 28 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1422, 1427-31 (1969); Rev. Rul. 63-101, 1963-1 C.B. 55.
292. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 106(a), 79
Stat. 286, 336 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 72(m)(7) (1994)). Several provisions of
the Code make use of the definition of disabled in Section 72(m)(7). For example,
Sections 72(q) and 72(t) provide that the penalty taxes that apply to premature
withdrawals from annuity contracts and qualified retirement plans do not apply to
withdrawals made by those who are disabled within the meaning of Section 72(m)(7).
I.R.C. §§ 72(q)(2)(C), 72(t)(2)(A)(iii) (1994). For the Treasury Department's regulations
that interpret Section 72(m)(7), see Treas. Reg. § 1.72-17A(f) (1979). For cases
interpreting Section 72(m)(7), see Fohrmeisterv. Commissioner,73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2483
(1997); Brown v. Commissioner,72 T.C.M. (CCH) 651 (1996); Dwyer v. Commissioner,
106 T.C. 337 (1996); Kovacevic v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1076 (1992).
293. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 505(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1566
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 105(d)(4) (repealed 1983)). Before Congress's 1976
amendment, former Section 105(d) permitted taxpayers to exclude from gross income
amounts that "constitute wages or payments in lieu of wages for a period during which
the employee is absent from work on account of personal injuries or sickness." As
amended in 1976, Section 105(d) made the exclusion available only to retired individuals
under age 65 who, when they retired, were "permanently and totally disabled."
Following Congress's 1976 amendment of former Section 105(d), the Treasury
Department issued temporary regulations, see Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 7.105-1, 7.105-2,
41 Fed. Reg. 56,630 (1976), and later issued superseding proposed regulations, see Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.105-9, 45 Fed. Reg. 46,082, 46,090 (1980). The proposed regulations
ultimately were withdrawn. See 52 Fed. Reg. 2724-25 (1987). For cases interpreting
former Section 105(d), as amended in 1976, see Bullardv. UnitedStates, 631 F. Supp.
811 (E.D. Va. 1985); Frenchv. Commissioner,61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2532 (1991); Beard v.
Commissioner,47 T.C.M. (CCH) 911 (1984); Smith v. Commissioner,48 T.C.M. (CCH)
1420 (1984); Schulz v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1519 (1982); Chapman v.
Commissioner,44 T.C.M. (CCH) 554 (1982); Pearson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 701
(1981).
294. Before 1984, the credit now provided by Section 22, see supra note 288, was
provided by Section 37. In 1984, Congress redesignated Section 37 as Section 22. See
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 474(d), 98 Stat. 494, 830-31.
Former Section 37 provided the credit only to those age 65 and over until 1983, when
Congress amended Section 37 to extend the credit to those who are permanently and
totally disabled. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 122(a),
97 Stat. 65, 85. The Treasury Department's regulations under former Section 37 still are
in effect, but they do not reflect Congress's extension of the credit to the permanently and
totally disabled. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.37-1, 1.37-2, 1.37-3 (as amended in 1980).
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other contexts in which Congress has used similar language might provide
sources of guidance to those interpreting Section 6511(h).
2. The Elements of Section 651 1(h)
Section 6511(h) amounts to an elaborate "if ...then" statement. If an
individual meets specific requirements, then the limitations periods specified in
subsections (a), (b), and (c) of Section 6511295 are suspended. Specifically,
Section 6511(h) can be restated as follows:
If:

1. the individual is "unable to manage his financial affairs,"
2.
3.

4.

the inability to manage is due to a "medically determinable
physical or mental impairment of the individual,"
the physical or mental impairment either:
a) is expected to result in death, or
b) has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months,
and
the individual submits proof of elements 1, 2, and 3 in such
form as the Secretary of the Treasury requires,296

then:
the periods specified in subsections (a), (b), and (c) are
suspended for the period during which the taxpayer was unable
to manage her financial affairs,
unless:
someone was authorized to act on the taxpayer's behalf in
financial matters, in which case the periods in subsections (a),
295. With respect to the periods specified in Sections 6511(a) and 6511(b), see
supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text. Section 6511(c) provides that, when a
taxpayer has agreed to extend the period within which the government can assess tax, the
period within which the taxpayer can file a claim for refund is extended six months
beyond the expiration of the period within which the government can assess tax. See
I.R.C. § 6511 (c)(1) (1994). Subject to several exceptions, the government can assess tax
within three years from the time the taxpayer files the return for the year in question. See
I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1994). The government commonly asks taxpayers during an audit to
agree to extend this period. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4) (1994). Section 6511 (c)
preserves
the right of those taxpayers who agree to such extensions to file claims for refund for the
years under examination by automatically extending the limitations periods that apply
to claims for refund. See I.R.C. § 6511 (c)(1994).
296. The statute technically requires the taxpayer to submit proof of only the
existence of the impairment. See I.R.C. § 6511 (h)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). Given the
statute's purpose, however, it seems proper to interpret it as requiring the taxpayer to
submit proof of all of the first three elements. The Service has interpreted it in this
manner. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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(b), and (c) are not suspended during the periods when someone
was authorized.
Each part of this statement is discussed below.
a. Inability to Manage Financial Affairs
Neither Section 6511(h) nor its legislative history elaborate on what it
means to be unable to manage one's financial affairs or on how the existence or
non-existence of this inability should be determined. A similar concept,
however, arises in at least two other contexts. First, courts are commonly called
upon to determine whether an individual's condition requires the appointment
of a conservator.297 A widely-used standard for determining whether a
conservator should be appointed is whether the person is unable to manage her
property and business affairs effectively for reasons such as mental or physical
illness or chronic intoxication.29 Similarly, in construing state statutes that
periods for those who are "incompetent" or of
permit tolling of' limitations
"unsound mind," 99 state courts commonly determine whether a person is
incompetent by inquiring whether she could manage her affairs. 30 This is not
to suggest that a person should be deemed "financially disabled" for purposes of
Section 65 11(h) only if the standards for appointing a conservator or for tolling

297. Manyjurisdictions distinguish between a conservator and a guardian. In these
jurisdictions, a conservator is a person appointed to manage the property and business
affairs of another, see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-137.4 (Michie Supp. 1999), and a
guardian is a person entrusted with the health and welfare of another, see, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. § 37.1-137.1 (Michie Supp. 1999). One person could be appointed to serve in both
capacities. See generally Paula L. Hannaford & Thomas L. Hafemeister, The National
ProbateCourtStandards: The Role of the Courts in Guardianshipand Conservatorship
Proceedings,2 ELDER L.J. 147, 149-50 (1994).
298. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2A-130(c) (1992); ALASKA STAT. §
13.26.165(2)(A) (Michie 1998); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-401(b) (Michie 1979 & Supp.
2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-29-01(2)(a) (1996). These provisions derive from either
Section 5-401(c) of the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE ("UPC"), 8 U.L.A. 1, 378 (1983), or
its free-standing counterpart, Section 2-301(c) -of the UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP AND
PROTECrIVE PROCEEDINGS AT ("UGPPA"), 8A U.L.A. 439,499 (1993). In 1997, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated revised
versions of the UPC and UGPPA. The statutory provisions listed here were derived from
the pre-1997 versions of these uniform acts.

299. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (West 1956 & Supp. 1999)
("unsound mind"); IDAHO CODE § 5-230 (1998) ("insane"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 5-201 (1998) ("mental incompetent").
300. See, e.g., Adkins v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 609 P.2d 15, 23 (Alaska
1980); Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 964 (Ariz. 1998) (en bane); Feeley v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 285 Cal. Rptr. 666, 667 (Ct. App. 1991); Charter Peachford Behavioral Health Sys.,
Inc. v. Kohout, 504 S.E.2d 514, 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
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a state limitations period would be met. The scope of the inquiry whether
someone is 'financiallydisabled," for example, seems narrower than the inquiry
required by many state tolling statutes. That is, it seems quite possible that an
individual could be unable to manage her financial affairs and yet continue to
function competently with respect to other aspects of her life. Similarly, the
inquiry whether a conservator should be appointed is heavily influenced by a
concern not present in the tax refund context: the desire to avoid an unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty."' Nevertheless, each of these bodies of law can
serve as useful sources of guidance.
The scope of the Service's planned inquiry into whether the taxpayer was
unable to manage her fmancial affairs is unclear. In both conservatorship
proceedings and decisions involving state tolling statutes, the inquiry typically
is detailed and fact-intensive. 2 One therefore would expect the Service to
require that taxpayers submit a statement setting forth facts based on which the
Service could evaluate whether and for what period the taxpayer was unable to
manage her affairs. Instead, the Service requires taxpayers to submit the
statement of a physician setting forth the physician's opinion as to the existence,
nature and duration of the taxpayer's impairment and as to whether (and for how
long) the impairment caused the taxpayer to be unable to mange her financial
affairs. 3 It could be that the Service is prepared to defer completely to the
physician's opinion, but this seems unlikely. In the absence of a mechanism by
which the Service can obtain other relevant information regarding the taxpayer's
situation, it is unclear on what basis the Service will decide whether to grant or
refuse relief. The merits of the Service's approach are discussed in Part VI. 3 '
An advantage of breaking Section 6511(h) down into its individual
elements is that their interrelationship becomes clear. One clarification that
emerges is that the taxpayer's inability to manage her financial affairs need not
last for any minimum length of time. Rather, it is the taxpayer's physical or
mental impairment that must be expected to result in death or to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months. There may well be situations
in which the taxpayer's impairment lasts (or is expected to last) for twelve
months yet causes the taxpayer to be unable to manage her affairs for a shorter
period. For example, some degree of impairment from a stroke, such as

301. See Norman Fell, Guardianshipand the Elderly: Oversight Not Overlooked,

25 U. TOL. L. REv. 189, 190 (1994) (noting that appointment of a guardian deprives an
individual of the right to make personal life decisions, to control finances, and to manage
property).
302. See, e.g., Florez v. Sargeant, 917 P.2d 250, 255 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc)
(tolling); In re Estate of Wagner, 367 N.W.2d 736, 738-41 (Neb. 1985)
(conservatorship); In re Conservatorship of Gessler, 419 N.W.2d 541, 541 (N.D. Ct.

App. 1988) (three-day hearing on conservatorship).
303. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
304. See infra Part VI.B.
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paralysis or inability to communicate, may last for the requisite period of time,
yet cause the taxpayer to be unable to manage her affairs for only a brief period.
b. Due to a Medically Determinable Physical or Mental Impairment
Section 6511 (h)(2)(A) requires that (1) the taxpayer have a physical or
mental impairment, (2) the impairment be medically determinable, and (3) the
impairment bear a causal relationship to the taxpayer's inability to manage her
financial affairs.
In many cases, determining the presence or absence of a physical or mental
impairment will not present significant issues."' For example,a taxpayer who
suffers a stroke or who lapses into a coma after being struck on the head
obviously would qualify. But certain cases may prove troublesome. Cases

involving alleged mental illness are likely to present particularly challenging
issues on a number of levels. Establishing the existence, nature and extent of
mental disorders is inherently difficult because of their subjective quality.3" 6
Compounding this difficulty is the fact that those who suffer from mental illness
often delay seeking treatment,3" 7 so that formal assessments of an individual's
mental condition may never take place, or may take place only years after the
relevant time period. The facts of United States v. Brockamp, °s the case that
prompted the enactment of Section 6511 (h), illustrate this point.309
It is reasonable to ask why the taxpayer's'impairment must be "medically
determinable." The likely answer is that the requirement attempts to distinguish
between those who truly could not file their refund claims within the prescribed
period and those who were merely neglectful.31 0 In this sense, the medically
determinable requirement is an example of the "distinct preference [of
legislatures] for basing eligibility for certain statutory benefits on presumably
objective diagnostic judgments made by medical professionals."' As will be

305. In an analogous context, a physical or mental impairment is defined by statute
as "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (1994) (definition used for purposes of
determining eligibility for SSDI benefits).
306. See Lawrence Joseph, The CausationIssue in Workers' CompensationMental
DisabilityCases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective,36 VAND. L. REV. 263,27173 (1983).
307. See OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE

SURGEON GENERAL 8 (1999) [hereinafter "SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT"].
308. 519 U.S. 347 (1997); see supraPart IV.B.
309. See infra notes 348-57 and accompanying text.
310. Cf.Liebman, supra note 289, at 843 (stating that the medical disability
requirement in the SSDI and SSI context is "an attempt to draw a line between voluntary
and involuntary unemployment").
311. Lars Noah, PigeonholingIllness: Medical Diagnosisas a Legal Construct,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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discussed in Part VI, the requirement of a "medically determinable" physical or
mental impairment should be removed from the statute.3"
c. Expected to Result in Death or to Last for a Continuous
Period of Not Less Than Twelve Months
To be eligible for relief under Section 6511(h), the taxpayer's physical or
mental impairment must be one that (1) is expected to result in death, or (2) has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months. This requirement has its origin in the Social Security Amendments of
1965, 3' 3 which modified the definition of "disabled" that is used for determining
whether an individual is eligible for SSDI benefits. As originally enacted in
1956, the SSDI definition of disabled required that the individual's physical or
mental impairment "be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and
indefinite duration., 31 4 The 1965 amendment changed this language to require
that the impairment be one that "can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months., 3 5 By substituting a fixed period of twelve months for an expected

existence of "long continued and indefinite duration," Congress intended to

increase the number of people eligible for SSDI benefits.316 Nevertheless,
Congress viewed the amended definition as distinguishing between those with
temporary and those with permanent impairments.3" 7 As will be discussed in
Part VI, requiring a permanent impairment as a condition of relief from Section
6511's limitations periods is inappropriate.318

50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 274-75 (1999).

312. See infra notes 365-71 and accompanying text.
313. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286.
314. Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 103(a), 70 Stat.
807, 815 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994)).
315. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 303(a), 79 Stat. 286, 366-67 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994)).
316. See S.REP. No.89-404 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2040.
317. See S.REP. No. 89-404 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 203839. The amendment as passed by the House would have made benefits available to those
disabled for a continuous period of six months. The Senate Finance Committee viewed
the House provision as extending benefits to those with short-term, temporary
disabilities. The Senate Finance Committee recommended requiring that the impairment
be expected to result in death or to last for at least twelve months because "in the great
majority of cases in which total disability continues for at least a year the disability is
essentially permanent." S. REP. No. 89-404 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1943, 2038-39. The House-Senate conferees adopted the Senate Finance Committee's
recommendation. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 89-682, reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2228, 2249 (amendment number 312).

318. See infra notes 372-76 and accompanying text.
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d. Submission of Proof to the Service
Section 651 1(h)(2) provides that a taxpayer is not considered to have the
requisite physical or mental impairment "unless proof of the existence thereof
is furnished in such form and manner as the Secretary may require." The
Service has issued guidance on what taxpayers must submit.319 Specifically, the

Service requires a taxpayer who seeks relief from the limitations periods to
submit a claim for refund accompanied by two written statements: (1) a
statement by a physician,32 and (2) a statement by the person signing the claim
for refund. The physician's statement, which must be made by a physician
"qualified to make the determination," must (a) name and describe the taxpayer's
physical or mental impairment, (b) provide the physician's medical opinion that
the physical or mental impairment prevented the taxpayer from managing her
financial affairs, (c) provide the physician's medical opinion that the physical or
mental impairment was or can be expected to result in death, or that it has lasted
(or can be expected to last) for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months, and (d) specify, to the best of the physician's knowledge, the time
period during which the taxpayer was prevented by the impairment from
managing her financial affairs.321 The second written statement-that of the
individual signing the claim for refund-must provide either (a) that no person
was authorized to act on behalf of the taxpayer in financial matters during the
period in which the taxpayer was unable to manage her own financial affairs, or
(b) that someone was authorized to act on behalf of the taxpayer, in which case
the statement must specify the beginning and ending dates of the authorizati6n.32
As will be discussed in Part VI, the Service should modify its requirements
regarding the taxpayer's submission to place less emphasis on the role of a
physician's medical opinion and should clarify when a person will3be considered
"authorized" to act on the taxpayer's behalf in financial matters. 23
e. Suspension of the Limitations Periods
Assuming that a taxpayer has the necessary physical or mental impairment,

Section 6511(h)(1) provides that the running of the periods specified in
subsections (a), (b), and (c) of Section 6511324 are suspended for the period

319. SeeRev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-17 I.R.B. 18.
320. The Revenue Procedure specifies that the term "physician" in this context has
the same meaning as in Section 1861(r)(1) of the Social Security Act, which is codified

at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r) (1994). See Rev. Proc. 99-21, § 4(1).
321. See Rev. Proc. 99-21, § 4(1).

322. See Rev. Proc. 99-21, § 4(2).
323. See infra Part VI.B.
324. With respect to the periods specified in subsections (a) and (b) of Section
6511, see supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text. With respect to the periods
specified in subsection (c), see supranote 295.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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during which the impairment causes the taxpayer to be unable to manage her
financial affairs.
Of the three subsections listed, the most significant is likely to be Section
651 l(b). The cases in which taxpayers have asserted that they failed to file a
timely claim for refund because they were unable to manage their affairs follow
a common fact pattern, which is the pattern illustrated earlier in example three.32
The taxpayer typically pays tax in the form of withholding from wages,
estimated tax payments, or unspecified payments remitted to the Service, and
then fails to file a return. Ultimately, either the taxpayer or a representative such
as a conservator or the administrator of the taxpayer's estate claims a refund by
filing a late return for the year in question.326 Under the majority and better
reasoned view discussed earlier,3 27 the taxpayer's claim is timely under Section
651 l(a) because the return and claim for refund are filed simultaneously. The
bar to recovery in these cases is Section 6511 (b)(2)(A), which provides that the
taxpayer's refund is limited to the portion of the tax paid within the period
immediately preceding the filing of the refund claim equal to three years plus the
period of any extension the taxpayer obtained for filing the return. Because
amounts withheld from wages and estimated tax payments are generally treated
by statute as paid on April 15 following the tax year in question,328 Section
6511(b)(2)(A) operates as a bar in these typical cases when the taxpayer or
representative claims a refund by filing a return more than three years after April
15, which normally is the due date of the return. 29 Thus, it is likely that in most
cases in which taxpayers are eligible for relief under Section 6511(h) the
limitations period from which relief will have to be granted is that set forth in
Section 6511 (b)(2)(A).330

325. See supranotes 117-51 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., Marco v. United States, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)

50,337, at

83,837 (D. Conn. 1998); First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. United States, 874 F. Supp.
286, 287, 290 (D.Nev. 1994), rev'd, 108 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1997); Wiltgen v. United
States, 813 F. Supp. 1387, 1388-89 (N.D. Iowa 1992); Johnsen v. United States, 758 F.
Supp. 834, 835-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
327. See supranotes 117-19 and accompanying text.
328. See supranotes 107-10 and accompanying text.
329. See supranote 108 and accompanying text.

330. The periods specified in Section 651 l(a) are likely to be a less significant bar
because, as discussed in the text, in the most common fact pattern the refund claim is
timely under Section 6511 (a). Similarly, it would appear to be a rare case in which the
periods in Section 6511 (c) would operate as a bar for taxpayers unable to manage their
financial affairs. Section 651 l(c) extends the time for filing a claim for refund when a
taxpayer has agreed to extend the time during which the Service can assess tax. See
supra note 295. Specifically, Section 651 l(c)(1) extends the time for filing a refund
claim to six months after the expiration of the Service's period for assessment. It is the
running of this six-month period (and the related look-back provision of Section
651 1(c)(2)) that is suspended pursuant to Section 6511 (h). For suspension of the sixmonth period to become necessary, it appears that the taxpayer's inability to manage her
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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A problem of interpretation arises from Section 6511 (h)'s use of the term
"suspended." To say that the running of a period is suspended presumes that the
period runs forward in time. But the period that will present the most significant
bar in these cases-the limit in Section 6511 (b)(2)(A) on the amount of tax
recoverable-looks backward from the date the taxpayer filed the claim for
refund. Presumably, Congress intended that the taxpayer's period of disability
be added to the look-back periods of Section 6511(b)(2). For example, a
taxpayer who is unable to manage her financial affairs for fifteen months would,
upon filing a claim for refund, be entitled to recover the portion of the tax paid
within the preceding three years and fifteen months.
f. Running of the Limitations Periods When Someone
is Authorized to Act on the Taxpayer's Behalf
Even if a taxpayer otherwise would be considered "financially disabled" by
reason of being unable to manage her financial affairs due to the requisite
physical or mental impairment, under Section 651 1(h)(2)(B) the taxpayer is not
treated as financially disabled during any period that the taxpayer's spouse or
another person is "authorized" to act on the taxpayer's behalf in financial
matters. That is, the running of the limitations periods in subsections (a), (b),
and (c) of Section 6511 are not suspended during any period in which someone
is authorized within the meaning of the statute. As discussed below, the
circumstances in which a person should be treated as authorized within the
meaning of Section 651 1(h)(2)(B) are narrow.
The rationale underlying Section 6511(h)(2)(B) provides a guide to the
provision's proper interpretation. The apparent rationale is that, if someone is
authorized to act on the taxpayer's behalf, then during the period of authorization
the taxpayer is capable of filing a claim for refund through the authorized person,
and therefore there is no need during the period of authorization to suspend the
running of the limitations periods. Accordingly, the proper inquiry for
determining whether someone was authorized within the meaning of the statute
is whether the person was capable of filing a claim for refund on the taxpayer's
behalf. As discussed earlier, taxpayers generally must claim a refund by filing
either an original or an amended return for the tax year in question.33' Therefore,
the only persons who should be considered authorized within the meaning of
Section 6511 (h)(2)(B) are those who can claim a refund for the taxpayer by
signing and filing such returns.
The issue of a representative's authorization will arise with respect to two
distinct categories of taxpayers: those who have died and those who are still
living but who are unable to make their own returns. The Code and the Treasury

financial affairs would have to begin during the six-month period itself. There are likely
to be few cases in this category.
331. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Department's regulations provide guidance in both situations. With respect to
taxpayers who have died, Section 6012(b)(1) provides that "[i]f an individual is
deceased, the [income tax] return of such individual... shall be made by his
executor, administrator, or other person charged with the property of such
' Thus,
decedent."332
in the case of a decedent, it is the court-appointed personal
representative of the decedent's estate who must claim an income tax refund by
signing and filing either an original return for the year in question (if the
decedent never filed one) or an amended return (if the decedent did file one). In
either case, the personal representative must submit with the claim for refund a
certified copy of the letters testamentary, letters of administration, or other
similar evidence of the representative's authority.333 Accordingly, a personal
representative should be considered authorized to act on behalf of a deceased
taxpayer for purposes of Section 6511 (h)(2)(B) only on and after the date on
which letters testamentary or letters of administration are issued.
With respect to taxpayers who are living but unable to make their own
returns, Section 6012(b)(2) provides that, "[i]f an individual is unable to make
[an income tax] return .... the return of such individual shall be made by a duly
authorized agent, his committee, guardian, fiduciary or other person charged
with the care of the person or property of such individual. '34 This provision
describes two basic categories of persons: (1) duly authorized agents, and
(2) guardians, conservators, and other court-appointed representatives. A courtappointed representative, like the personal representative of a deceased
taxpayer's estate, should be treated as authorized to act on the taxpayer's behalf
in financial matters beginning only on the date of the representative's
appointment. 335 Determining when an agent other than a court-appointed
representative should be treated as authorized is somewhat more complex and
is discussed below.

332. I.R.C. § 6012(b)(1) (1994); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(b)(1) (as amended
in 1995) (executor or administrator of estate of decedent, or other person charged with
decedent's property, shall make the decedent's income tax return); Treas. Reg. §
601.503(d)(3) (as amended in 1992) (executor, personal representative or administrator
acting for decedent in tax matters should file Form 56, "Notice Concerning Fiduciary
Relationship").
333. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(e) (as amended in 1982).
334. I.R.C. § 6012(b)(2) (1994).

335. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(b)(3) (as amended in 1995) (fiduciary acting as

guardian or committee of "insane person" must make the person's income tax return);
Treas. Reg. § 601.503(d)(4) (as amended in 1992) (guardian or other fiduciary appointed

by court of record should file with Service Form 56, "Notice Concerning Fiduciary
Relationship," and Service may require submission of court certificate or court order
regarding fiduciary's appointment); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(e) (as amended in 1982)

(when claim for refund is filed by fiduciary other than fiduciary who filed original return,
documentary evidence of the fiduciary's authority must be submitted with the claim).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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The circumstances in which agents other than court-appointed
representatives are treated as authorized to claim a refund for a living taxpayer
for purposes of Section 6511(h)(2)(B) should be few in number. To file an
original or an amended return that serves as a claim for refund, such an agent
must have received from the taxpayer authority to do so pursuant to a written
power of attorney, which the agent must submit with the refund claim.336
Further, the Service regards an agent as authorized to sign an original or
amended return on behalf of the taxpayer only when the power of attorney

specifically gives the agent authority in this regard.337 Even the Service's
prescribed form for powers of attorney, Form 2848,338 does not grant a
representative authority to sign returns for the taxpayer unless the taxpayer
inserts a specific provision that grants such authority.339 Therefore, a person
other than a court-appointed representative should be treated as authorized to act
for a living taxpayer under Section 6511(h)(2)(B) only if the person holds a
written power of attorney that specifically grants the person authority to sign tax
returns on the taxpayer's behalf. As a specific example, spouses and other
relatives of the taxpayer who do not hold such a power of attorney should not be
treated as authorized for purposes of the statute.34
Even if a person falls into one of the categories of those who should be
considered authorized to act on the taxpayer's behalf for purposes of Section
651 1(h)(2)(B), the limitations periods of Section 6511 should not run against the
taxpayer in all circumstances. For example, suppose that a taxpayer, while fully
able to manage her financial affairs, "specifically grants authority to sign tax
returns to her accountant or attorney on Form 2848. If the taxpayer subsequ6ntly
becomes unable to manage her affairs and loses touch with her authorized

336. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(a)(5) (as amended in 1986); Treas. Reg. §
301.6402-2(e) (as amended in 1982).
337. See Treas. Reg. § 601.503(a)(6) (as amended in 1992) (power of attorney
must contain "a clear expression of the taxpayer's intention concerning the scope of
authority granted"); Treas. Reg. § 601.504(a)(6) (as amended in 1992) (power of attorney
does not authorize agent to sign tax return on behalf of taxpayer unless such act is both
permitted under Code and regulations and specifically authorized in power of attorney).
338. See Treas. Reg. § 601.503(b)(1) (as amended in 1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012l(a)(5) (as amended in 1986).
339. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-19-001 (Dec. 30, 1980) (Form 2848 that
granted CPA authority to represent taxpayers before the Service did not provide CPA
with authority to sign amended return that served as claim for refund, even though
taxpayers orally authorized CPA to sign the return).
340. A spouse is permitted to sign a joint return on behalf of a spouse who is
physically unable to sign the return due to disease or injury as long as the disabled spouse
orally consents to the signature. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(a)(5) (as amended in 1986).
This rule should not form the basis for treating the disabled spouse as having someone
who is authorized to act on her behalf in financial matters for purposes of Section
6511(h)(2)(B). Doing so effectively would make relief under Section 6511(h)
unavailable to all married taxpayers.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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representative (e.g., if the taxpayer begins to suffer from mental illness and
becomes homeless), it would be inequitable for the limitations periods to run
against the taxpayer by virtue of her previous grant of authority. The attorney
or accountant in this example should not be treated as authorized to act on the
taxpayer's behalf in financial matters. The Service and the courts could reach
this result by applying the general common law rule that a principal's loss of
" '
capacity terminates the agent's authority.34
A similar situation could arise in the case of the death of a taxpayer who
was unable to manage her financial affairs. Assume that, before her death, the
taxpayer authorized a person to sign returns on her behalf pursuant to a written
power of attorney, so that the taxpayer was not considered financially disabled
pursuant to Section 651 l(h)(2)(B) while living. Unless the power of attorney is
one that survives the principal's death, the taxpayer's death should terminate the
agent's authority. 4 In that case, the limitations periods of Section 6511 should
not run against the taxpayer between the date of the taxpayer's death and the date
that a court appoints a personal representative for the taxpayer's estate.
A third situation in which the limitations periods of Section 6511 should not
run against the taxpayer, despite the presence of an authorized representative, is
when a fiduciary authorized to manage the taxpayer's financial affairs acts
adversely to the taxpayer.343 For example, if the fiduciary of a taxpayer who is
unable to manage her affairs makes "gifts" to himself and pays gift tax from the
taxpayer's assets,3" the taxpayer should not be treated for purposes of Section
651 l(h)(2)(B) as having a person authorized to act on her behalf. It would be
contrary to the policy underlying Section 6511 (h) to interpret it in a manner that
allows the government to benefit from the fiduciary's malfeasance in this
situation. Treating such a fiduciary as unauthorized for purposes of the statute
can be supported by the same rationale that underlies the adverse domination
doctrine. Under this doctrine, the running of limitations periods on claims

341. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 & cmt. d (1957); cf. Halper
v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1897 (1997) (authority granted on Form 2848 to
taxpayer's representative terminated when taxpayer became incapacitated due to a stroke,
and representative therefore had no authority to consent to extension of limitations period
for assessment of tax).
342. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 120 (1957).
343. Cf.RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228(1)(c), 235 (1957) (master not
subject to liability in tort for act of servant committed without intent to serve the master);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282(1) (1957) (knowledge of agent not attributed
to principal when agent acts adversely to the principal and entirely for his own or
another's purposes).

344. See, e.g., Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 692-93 (4th Cir. 1995)
(taxpayer asserted that her doctor and lawyer, who kept her isolated and sedated and
obtained control over taxpayer's financial matters, made "gifts" to themselves and their
families and paid more than $11 million in gift tax from taxpayer's assets), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1148 (1997).
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against a fiduciary, such as a claim by a corporation against its directors and
officers, is suspended for periods during which the fiduciary acts adversely and
therefore cannot be expected to protect his ward's interests by asserting a claim
against himself.345
As discussed in Part VI, the Service should issue guidance that specifies
when a person will be treated as authorized to act on the taxpayer's behalf in
financial matters. 3
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Congress should amend Section 6511(h) to tailor the provision to the needs
of the majority of taxpayers who will seek its relief, to make the provision less
burdensome for both taxpayers and the government, and to eliminate
requirements that are antithetical to the statute's underlying purpose.' Until
Congress takes action, the Service should implement changes to the manner in
which it interprets and administers Section 6511(h) as it currently exists.

A. Amendment of Section 6511(h)
This section proposes four specific changes to Section 6511(h). Congress
should: (1) add a simpler, alternative means by which taxpayers can avail
themselves of the provision's relief, (2) eliminate the requirement that the
taxpayer's physical or mental impairment be "medically determinable,"
(3) eliminate the requirement that the taxpayer's impairment be expected to

345. See, e.g., In re Estate of Payroll Express Corp., 186 F.3d 196, 205-07 (2d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1419 (2000); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 61
F.3d 421, 425-31 (5th Cir. 1995); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Grant, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1275,
1282-84 (N.D. Okla. 1998); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 980 P.2d 141, 144-47 (Or.
1999); Admiralty Fund v. Peerless Ins. Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 753, 757-59 (Ct. App. 1983).
346. See infra Part VI.B.
347. Section 6511(h) takes the same general approach as the early tolling proposals
put forth by Representative Jennifer Dunn and the Treasury Department, i.e., it limits
relief to those unable to manage their financial affairs. See supra notes 271-82 and
accompanying text (discussing early proposals). One commentator has criticized this

approach as too narrow, and has advocated that Congress permit the late filing of claims
for refund when the taxpayer can establish that the late filing was due to reasonable cause
and not due to willful neglect. See Morris, supranote 190, at 149-56; infra notes 383-86
and accompanying text (discussing reasonable cause). In essence, Professor Morris
advocates permitting the late filing of refund claims when extraordinary circumstances
beyond the taxpayer's control have prevented the taxpayer from asserting the claim in
a timely manner, which, as discussed earlier, is a ground upon which courts toll

limitations periods in other contexts as a matter of equity. The Author does not
necessarily disagree with Professor Morris's proposal. Rather, now that Congress has
enacted legislation, the Author has chosen in this Article to focus attention on problems

inherent in the approach that Congress adopted.
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result in death or to last for a continuous period of twelve months, and (4) clarify
that the relevant limitations periods will ran against a taxpayer who is otherwise
financially disabled only when someone is authorized to claim a refund on the
taxpayer's behalf. This section discusses each of these proposed changes and
then sets forth suggested statutory language.
1. Add a Simpler Alternative
As discussed earlier,34 the cases in which taxpayers have asserted that they
failed to file a timely claim for refund because they were unable to manage their
affairs follow a common fact pattern. In this pattern, the taxpayer pays too much
income tax in the form of withholding from wages, estimated tax payments, or
unspecified payments remitted to the Service. The taxpayer fails to claim a
refund by filing a return for the year because, the taxpayer asserts, at the time the
return was due and the tax payments are treated as made (normally April 15),349
she was unable to manage her affairs. Either the taxpayer or a representative
such as a conservator or the administrator of the taxpayer's estate later claims a
refund by filing a late return. For this most common situation, the approach of
current Section 6511(h) is not well suited.
Current Section 6511(h) requires the Service and the courts to determine the
precise period of time during which the taxpayer was unable to manage her
financial affairs. It is this precise period of time (less any period of time in
which someone was authorized to act on the taxpayer's behalf) that constitutes
the additional time within which the taxpayer is permitted to claim a refund.
This approach is unsuitable for the typical situation described above for two
related reasons. First, the limitations periods in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of
Section 6511 are short, which increases the likelihood that any imprecision in
ascertaining the dates on which the taxpayer's disability began and ended will
work to the taxpayer's disadvantage.35 Second, determinations of whether a

348. See supranotes 325-30 and accompanying text.
349. See supranotes 108-10 and accompanying text.
350. This risk is particularly acute for taxpayers who bring refund actions in federal
district courts within the Ninth Circuit. The following example, based on the facts of
Roman v. United States, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,591 (N.D. Cal. 1995), illustrates
this point. Assume that a taxpayer has amounts withheld from her wages during 1999.
The amounts withheld would be treated as tax payments made on April 15, 2000. See
supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. Assume further that the taxpayer dies in
September 2002 without ever filing a return for 1999, and that her executor, appointed
in October 2002, can establish that the taxpayer was unable to manage her financial
affairs for only twelve months prior to her death (i.e., beginning in September 2001).
Under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 6511 (a), the executor would have only
seven months within which to claim a refund by filing a 1999 return. According to the

Ninth Circuit, because the return that the executor files will be filed more than two years
after the taxpayer paid the tax, the return will not constitute a "return" for purposes of
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taxpayer was unable to manage her financial affairs will commonly take place
"
many years after the relevant time periods,35
' which increases the risk of
imprecision in identifying the taxpayer's precise period of disability. For
example, in the case that prompted the enactment of Section 6511(h), United
States v. Brockamp,352 there is no indication in the opinions of the district

court, 3 the court of appeals3"4 or the Supreme Court,355 or in the briefs filed by
the parties in the Supreme Court,35 6 that the taxpayer, an elderly man described
by his administrator as "senile," ever had a formal assessment of his mental
condition. Current Section 6511(h) nevertheless would require such a
determination at the time his administrator submitted the refund claim, which
was nearly seven years after he paid the tax in question. Such after-the-fact
determinations of the precise beginning and ending dates of the disability are
likely to be highly inaccurate. The risk of harm from this inaccuracy should not

Section 6511(a). See supranotes 120-24 and accompanying text. The taxpayer will be
treated for purposes of Section 651 l(a) as if she had not filed a return. In order to be
timely, therefore, the executor's claim for refund must be filed within two years from the
time the taxpayer paid the tax. See I.R.C. § 6511 (a) (1994) (refund claim must be filed
within two years from time tax was paid "if no return was filed by the taxpayer"). This
two year period would run against the taxpayer from April 15, 1999, until she became
unable to manage her financial affairs in September 2001, a period of approximately
seventeen months. Her executor therefore would have only the seven months remaining
in the two-year period within which to claim a refund by filing a 1999 return.
351. In this respect, the determination required by Section 6511(h) differs from the
determination required in the contexts from which Congress borrowed the language and
structure of the new provision. As discussed earlier, Congress borrowed the language
of Section 6511(h) from Section 22(e)(3), which is the definition of "permanently and
totally disabled" used for purposes of determining who is eligible for the tax credit
provided by Section 22(a). See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text. The
language of Section 22(e)(3) originated in the definition of "disabled" used for purposes
of determining eligibility for SSDI benefits. See supra notes 286-94 and accompanying
text. In both of those contexts, the question is whether an individual is "unable to engage
in any substantial gainful activity" by reason of a physical or mental impairment, rather
than whether the individual is "unable to manage his financial affairs" as in Section
6511(h). The determination whether an individual is unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity is likely to take place much more contemporaneously with the condition's
onset than is the determination whether a person was unable to manage her financial
affairs.

352. 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
353. See Brockamp v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1283 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
354. See Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995).
355. See Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 347.
356. See Petitioner's Brief at 4-5 & n.1, Brockamp (No. 95-1225), available in
1996 WL 403,339; Respondent's Brief at 1-3, Brockamp (No. 95-1225), available in
1996 WL 496,832. The government's reply brief in Brockamp provides no information
on the taxpayer's condition because it addresses only questions of law. See Reply Brief,
Brockamp (No. 95-1225), availablein 1996 WL 554,432.
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needlessly be visited upon taxpayers who suffer from mental illness. To utilize
such post-hoc determinations effectively penalizes such taxpayers for their delay
in seeking treatment, a delay that often is attributable to the stigma that society
continues to attach to mental illness.357
To avoid the risk of harm from imprecise determinations of the beginning
and ending dates of a taxpayer's disability, and to reduce the government and
taxpayer resources consumed in such detailed factfinding, Congress should add
to Section 6511(h) an alternative means of satisfying the statute that is more
tailored to the most common factual situation. Under this alternative, the
taxpayer would be required to establish, first, that she was unable to manage her
financial affairs at the time she is treated as having paid the tax for purposes of
Section 6511, and second, that no person was authorized to claim a refund on her
behalf on the deemed payment date. If the taxpayer meets these requirements,
then under Section 6511(a) the taxpayer would have a longer, fixed period of
time, measured from the due date of the return, within which to file a claim for
refund. The recommended fixed period is seven years. A seven-year period
would be consistent with Section 6511(d)(1), which adopts the approach
recommended here in a situation that presents an analogous problem.358 Under
this proposal, if the taxpayer files a claim for refund within the seven-year
period, then the taxpayer would be permitted to recover the amount of the
overpayment attributable to the taxpayer's inability to manage her financial
affairs, notwithstanding the limits on the amount recoverable in Section
6511(b)(2).
To illustrate the proposal, consider the facts of Brockamp. In Brockamp,
the taxpayer, who was ninety-three years old, mailed to the Service on April 15,
1984, a check for $7,000 accompanied by an application for automatic extension
of time (Form 4868) to file his 1983 income tax return.359 The taxpayer died in
1988 without ever having filed an income tax return for the 1983 taxable year.36
The taxpayer's daughter, Mrs. Brockamp, was appointed administrator of his

357. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supranote 307, at 8.

358. Section 651 l(d)(1) permits a taxpayer to file a claim for refund within seven
years from the due date of the return if the claim relates to an overpayment of income tax
that arises from the taxpayer's deduction of a bad debt or worthless security. See I.R.C.
§ 6511(d)(1) (1994). Congress enacted this extended period of limitation because of the
difficulty taxpayers often have in determining the specific taxable year in which the debt
or security became worthless. See H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 44-45 (1942), reprintedin
1942-2 C.B. 372, 408. If the taxpayer files the claim within the prescribed seven-year
period, then Section 6511 (d)(1) permits the amount of the refund to exceed the amount
normally permitted under Section 6511(b)(2) to the extent of the amount of the
overpayment attributable to the taxpayer's deduction of the bad debt or worthless
security.
359. See Brockamp v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1283, 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
360. See id. at 1284-85.
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estate on January 4, 1989.361 During the administration of the estate, Mrs.
Brockamp discovered the $7,000 payment to the Service and sought a refund by
filing an income tax return for 1983 on March 27, 199 1.362 The return reflected
that the taxpayer's actual income tax liability for 1983 was $427.363 Under the
proposed addition to current Section 6511 (h), Mrs. Brockamp would be required

to establish that her father was unable to manage his financial affairs in a period
of time that includes April 15, 1984, the date on which the tax is treated as paid
for purposes of Section 6511. She also would be required to establish that no
person was authorized to file a claim for refund on his behalf on the deemed
payment date. If she meets these requirements, then the period in Section
6511 (a) for filing a claim for refund would be seven years, measured from the
due date of the 1983 return. Accordingly, she would have until April 15, 1991,
to claim a refund by filing the 1983 return. Because she filed the 1983 return
before this date, her refund claim would be timely under Section 6511(a). The
amount of tax recoverable would be permitted to exceed the amount normally
recoverable under Section 6511(b)(2)(A) to the extent of the amount of the
overpayment attributable to the taxpayer's inability to manage his financial
affairs, or in this case, $6,573.
A seven-year period should enable virtually all taxpayers in this most
common scenario to file timely claims for refund. Refund claims in this situation
are typically filed within three to five years after the taxpayer's earliest payment
of tax.3 4 In Brockamp, the refund claim was filed almost seven years after the
taxpayer's payment of tax, but this unusually long period is due in part to the fact
that the taxpayer's administrator did not file the refund claim until more than two
years after her appointment.
The proposed addition to Section 6511(h) set forth above is tailored to the
most common factual scenario in which taxpayers unable to manage their
financial affairs seek a tax refund. It focuses attention on the relevant point in
time, which is the date on which the taxpayer is treated as having paid too much

361. See id. at 1285.
362. See id.
363. See id.; Petitioner's Brief at 5, Brockamp (No. 95-1225), availablein 1996

WL 403339.
364. See Marco v. United States, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,337 (D.Conn.
1998) (payments deemed made April 1988, refund claim filed September 1991); First
Interstate Bank of Nev. v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 286, 287 (D. Nev. 1994) (earliest
payment deemed made April 1986, refund claim filed October 1991), rev'd, 108 F.3d
1185 (9th Cir. 1997); Scott v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1499, 1501 (D. Haw. 1993)
(payments deemed made April 1984, refund claim filed November 1989), aff'd, 95-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,557 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 519 U.S. 347 (1997); Wiltgen v.
United States, 813 F. Supp. 1387, 1389, 1391 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (earliest payments
deemed made April 1982, refund claim filed December 1986); Johnsen v. United States,
758 F. Supp. 834, 835 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (payments deemed made April 1984, refund
claim filed 1987).
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tax and on which the taxpayer should have, but did not, file a return claiming a
refund. The proposal would permit the Service and the courts to resolve most
cases involving alleged financial disability without relying on inherently
imprecise determinations of the beginning and ending dates of the taxpayer's
disability. Because the proposal would not cover all possible scenarios in which
financially disabled taxpayers might seek refunds, however, Congress should
retain the current date-specific approach of Section 6511(h) as an alternative
means by which taxpayers can obtain the provision's relief. For example, a
taxpayer who is fully capable of managing her financial affairs when she pays
tax, but who subsequently becomes incapacitated before filing a claim for
refund, would not be eligible for relief under the proposal set forth above. As
an illustration, a taxpayer might pay estimated tax and file a request for an
automatic extension of time to file her return while fully competent, and shortly
afterward become physically injured and lapse into a coma. Congress should
retain the statute's current approach to address this type of less common
situation.
2. Eliminate the "Medically Determinable" Requirement
The requirement in current Section 6511(h) that the taxpayer's physical or
mental impairment be "medically determinable" represents an abdication of
responsibility. The difficult issue that Section 6511(h) addresses is whether
there are circumstances in which, as a matter of policy, we will not insist on
strict compliance with the limitations periods that apply to claims for tax refunds.
The statute's overall approach is a sensible response: we will not insist on strict
compliance when, due to a physical or mental impairment, the taxpayer was
incapable of complying. But to require that the taxpayer's impairment be
medically determinable is an inappropriate attempt to place the burden of
determining who is eligible for relief under the statute on the medical
community." Medical evidence is, of course, relevant to the determination of
whether a taxpayer suffered from a condition that caused her to be unable to
comply. But the responsibility for making the ultimate determination regarding
the taxpayer's ability to comply should rest with the Service and the courts. To
require that the taxpayer demonstrate a medically determinable impairment
encourages excessive and perhaps exclusive reliance on medical evidence, a risk
to which the Service's current published guidance on Section 651 1(h), discussed
below, is witness.366

365. Cf.Noah, supra note 311, at 282 (noting in the SSDI and SSI context that
delegating the assessment of the functional impact of impairments to the medical
profession obscures the difficult political choices involved in determining which
individuals to excuse from work).
366. See infra Part VI.B.
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The requirement that the taxpayer's physical or mental impairment be
medically determinable might be supported as necessary to eliminate false claims
of inability to comply with Section 651 1's limitations periods. The requirement,
however, does little to address this concern. The cases in which the courts have
expressed willingness to grant relief typically present compelling facts involving
taxpayers who suffer from an obvious inability to manage their affairs.367 In
these cases, the requirement of a medically determinable impairment serves little
purpose. The situations in which there will be some question as to the taxpayer's
ability to comply with the limitations period are precisely those in which a
physician's determination is likely to be least helpful in distinguishing false from
meritorious claims. The primary situation of this type is that in which the
taxpayer received no care from a treating physician at the time the taxpayer paid
too much in tax and failed to file a claim for refund. In this situation, the
taxpayer likely will submit reports from physicians who examined the taxpayer
long after the fact or even from those who have never examined the taxpayer but
who have reviewed any medical records that the taxpayer might possess.
In
68
weight.
limited
given
properly
are
reports
such
contexts,
analogous
This is not to suggest that the Service and the courts should not take
medical evidence into account in determining whether to grant relief. The point
is that the statutory prerequisite of a medically determinable impairment
encourages excessive reliance on medical evidence in situations in which such
evidence should be only one factor in the assessment of a taxpayer's ability to
comply with the relevant limitations periods. To avoid such undue reliance,
Congress should amend Section 6511(h) to incorporate the standard put forth by
Representative Jennifer Dunn in her early legislative proposal: the taxpayer
should be required to establish that her inability to manage her financial affairs

367. See, e.g., FirstInterstateBank, 874 F. Supp. at 289-90 (taxpayer "confused
and disoriented as to person, place and time, and was unable to handle her personal
hygiene or to conduct any financial affairs" and ultimately admitted to convalescent
hospital); Wiltgen, 813 F. Supp. at 1389 (conservator and guardian appointed for
taxpayer); Johnsen, 758 F. Supp. at 835 (husband, wife, and son all adjudicated
incompetents). In contrast, the courts have demonstrated that they are quite capable of
recognizing spurious claims of inability to file timely claims due to mental incompetence.
See Roman v. United States, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,591, at 89,958 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (taxpayer failed to meet burden of establishing inability to comply); Brennan v.
United States, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,247, at 84,025 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (same).
368. See, e.g., Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting in SSI
context that consultative exams by nontreating physicians are often brief and give only
a glimpse of the claimant on a single day); Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294, 296-97 (2d
Cir. 1987) (stating in SSI context that expert opinion of treating physician is binding on

factfinder absent substantial evidence to the contrary, and opinion of non-examining
physician does not constitute such substantial evidence); Nelson v. Heckler, 712 F.2d
346, 348 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating in SSDI context that opinion of non-examining

physician should be given little weight).
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was due to a "debilitating" physical or mental impairment. 69 The term
debilitating is appropriate in this context because it conveys that the taxpayer's
condition must be one that weakens or enfeebles, which accurately describes the
sorts of conditions that typically render a taxpayer unable to manage her
financial affairs.
The facts of Brockamp illustrate the type of situation in which medical
evidence should be only one factor that the Service and the courts take into
account in assessing a taxpayer's inability to manage his financial affairs. As
discussed earlier,37 there is no indication that the taxpayer in Brockamp ever had
a formal assessment of his mental condition. Assuming this is the case, his

administrator might submit to the Service reports of physicians who had never
examined the taxpayer but who could offer opinions concerning his condition
based on any medical records that might exist and on descriptions of the
taxpayer's behavior. Although such reports could be helpful, they should not be
conclusive. The Service should also take into account specific facts that tend to
indicate whether the taxpayer was unable to manage his affairs. In the
taxpayer's brief to the Supreme Court in Brockamp, the administrator suggested
that she would be able to prove several facts of this nature, such as that the
taxpayer looked dazed and disoriented, was unaware when confronted that he
had walked to the comer mailbox in a state of undress, and often paid bills for
$100 and $400 with checks for $1,000 and $4,000. 37 1 If proven, such facts
should establish the requisite debilitating mental condition.
3. Eliminate the Requirement that the Taxpayer's Impairment be

Expected to Result in Death or to Last for Twelve Months
As discussed earlier,372 the requirement that an impairment be expected to
result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months has its
origin in the Social Security Amendments of 1965, 373 which modified the
definition of the term "disabled" used for purposes of determining eligibility for
SSDI (and later SSI) benefits. Congress viewed this requirement as a means of
distinguishing between those with temporary and those with permanent
impairments .3 4 Although this distinction might be appropriate in the context in
which it originated, it has little relevance in the tax refund context.
When an individual applies for SSDI or SSI benefits, the policy question
presented is whether, due to the individual's claimed inability to work, society

369. See supranote 276 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 352-56 and accompanying text.
371. See Respondent's Brief at 1-3, Brockamp (No. 95-1225), availablein 1996
WL 496832.
372. See supra notes 313-17 and accompanying text.
373. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286.

374. See supranote 317 and accompanying text.
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is willing to support that person. It is a reasonable response to that question to

say that we are willing to support only those who have a permanent impairment
that renders them unable to work, and that we expect those with short-term,
temporary disabilities to provide for themselves. Such a distinction makes little
sense, however, when the policy question is whether we are prepared to excuse
an individual from the obligation to seek a tax refund within a specified period
of time. For example, suppose that two and one-half years after filing her timely
return a taxpayer discovers that she is entitled to a refund, begins to prepare her
claim for refund, and then receives a blow to the head that incapacitates her for
six months. There is no compelling reason why the limitations period should not
be suspended for these six months merely because the taxpayer did not have an
impairment of a permanent nature. Indeed, to require a permanent impairment
is inconsistent with the underlying premise of both statutory and equitable
tolling, which is that a claimant is temporarily unable to assert a claim but will
be able to do so at some point in the future."' It is perhaps for this reason that
state tolling statutes do not condition relief on the existence of an impairment
that lasts for a minimum period of time." 6 Congress should amend Section
6511(h) to eliminate this requirement.
4. Clarify that the Limitations Periods Will Run Against an Otherwise
Financially Disabled Taxpayer Only When a Person is Authorized to
File on the Taxpayer's Behalf a Claim for Refund
Section 651 1(h)(2)(B) provides that the relevant limitations periods are not
suspended during any period in which someone was "authorized to act on behalf
of [the taxpayer] in financial matters." As discussed earlier,377 however, the
proper inquiry in this context is not whether the person was authorized in
connection with "financial matters," but rather whether the person was capable
of filing a claim for refund on the taxpayer's behalf. Although the Service can
(and, as discussed below,3 78 should) implement this distinction administratively
by making clear that a person will be treated as authorized for purposes of
Section 6511(h) only when the person can file a claim for refund on the
taxpayer's behalf, Congress should clarify this point by amending the statute.

375. See supraPart ll.A.
376. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-8 (Supp. 1999); CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 352
(West 1982 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.051(l)(h) (West Supp. 2000); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-211 (West 1992); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 260, § 7 (West 1992),
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 208 (McKinney 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229 (Michie 2000); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.190 (West Supp. 2000).
377. See supranotes 331-40 and accompanying text.
378. See infra Part VI.B.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

75

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 1

MISSOURJLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 65

5. Suggested Statutory Language
The following statutory language would implement the four specific
changes to Section 6511(h) discussed in the preceding parts of this section:
(h) SPECIAL RULES FOR TAXPAYERS UNABLE TO MANAGE FINANCIAL
AFFAIRS DUE TO DISABILITY.

(1) IN GENERAL. -

-

In the case of an individual

(A) SPECIAL SEVEN-YEAR PERIOD OF LIMITATION.

-

If the claim for credit or refund relates to an overpayment of
tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer
is required to file a return, and if, on the date the taxpayer is
treated for purposes of this section as paying the tax the
taxpayer was financially disabled, then, in lieu of the 3-year
period of limitation prescribed in subsection (a), the period
shall be 7 years from the date prescribed by law for filing
the return (determined with regard to any extension of time
granted the taxpayer) for the tax with respect to which the
claim is made. In the case of a claim described in this
subparagraph the amount of the credit or refund may exceed
the portion of the tax paid within the period prescribed in
subsection (b)(2) or (c), whichever is applicable, to the
extent of the amount of the overpayment attributable to the
taxpayer's being financially disabled.
(B) SUSPENSION OF LIMITATIONS PERIODS. -

Regardless of whether a taxpayer is eligible for the special
limitations period set forth in subparagraph (A), the running
of the periods specified in subsections (a), (b), and (c) shall
be suspended during any period of an individual's life that
such individual is financially disabled.
(2) FINANCIALLY DISABLED. (A) INGENERAL. - For purposes ofparagraph (1), an
individual is financially disabled if such individual is unable
to manage his financial affairs by reason of a debilitating
physical or mental impairment of the individual. An
individual shall not be considered to have such an
impairment unless proof of the existence thereof is furnished
in such form and manner as the Secretary may require.
(3) EXCEPTION WHERE INDIVIDUAL HAS GUARDIAN,
ETC. - An individual shall not be treated as financially
disabled during any period in which another person both is
authorized to act for the individual and could, under this
subtitle and regulations prescribed by the Secretary, submit
a claim for refund on the individual's behalf.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/1
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B. Changes in the InterpretationandAdministration of
CurrentSection 6511(h)
Until Congress amends Section 6511(h), the Service should take two
important steps with respect to the manner in which it interprets and administers
the statute.
First, the Service should place less emphasis on the role of a physician's
medical opinion. According to the Service's published guidance on Section
6511(h)37 9 a physician's opinion is the only evidence that the Service requires
taxpayers to submit on four significant issues: (1) the existence of a physical or
mental impairment, (2) the duration of the impairment, (3) whether the
impairment caused the taxpayer to be unable to manage her financial affairs, and
(4) for how long the taxpayer was unable to manage her financial affairs due to
the impairment.3" Although a physician's opinion is relevant to each of these
issues, it should not be the sole evidence that the Service considers. Such
exclusive reliance is contrary to congressional intent.381 It also is questionable
from a policy perspective because a medical opinion's degree of reliability
decreases with each issue.382 Even if one accepts that a medical opinion
constitutes sufficient evidence to establish the existence of an impairment, it does
not follow that it is equally sufficient to establish the impairment's duration, its
causal relationship to the taxpayer's inability to manage her financial affairs, and
the length of time for which the impairment caused the inability. Particularly
with respect to the latter two issues, the Service should take into account other

relevant evidence.

379. See Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-17 I.R.B. 18.
380. See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
381. The legislative history of Section 6511(h) sets forth Congress's expectation
that "in applying the medically determinable test, the Secretary will evaluate whether a
medical opinion that a physical or mental impairment exists has been offered by a person
qualified to do so with respect to that particular type of impairment." H.R. REP. No. 105364, pt. 1, at 68-69 (1997). Congress clearly did not envision that the Service would rely
exclusively on a physician's opinion. Rather, Congress appears to have contemplated
that the Service would consider a physician's opinion along with other relevant evidence.

Indeed, the legislative history suggests that the Service has authority to grant relief even
in the absence of a medical opinion.
382. The reliability of the opinion also depends on the nature of the relationship
between the taxpayer and the physician. For example, it would be reasonable for the
Service to assign greater value to the opinion of the taxpayer's treating physician, and
less value to the opinions of an examining physician (one who does not provide treatment

but rather examines the taxpayer solely for the purpose of determining the existence and
duration of the impairment) or a review physician (one who bases an opinion solely on
a review of the taxpayer's medical records). Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (1995)

(opinion of treating physician given greatest weight in determining claimant's eligibility
for SSDI benefits).
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As an illustration, the Service might consider specific examples of the
taxpayer's successful or unsuccessful handling of financial matters, such as
whether the taxpayer managed bank accounts and complied with state tax filing
obligations during the time period in question. To gather this evidence, the
Service should require taxpayers or their representatives to submit a factual
statement. This is the same approach that the Service takes in analogous areas.
For example, taxpayers are subject to penalties if they do not timely file their
income tax returns 383 or certain informational returns, 3" but the penalty is not
imposed if, among other requirements, the taxpayer establishes that the failure
' 5 To assist it in determining whether the
was due to "reasonable cause."38
taxpayer's failure was due to reasonable cause, the Service requires that
taxpayers submit a detailed factual statement.386
The second step that the Service should take is to provide guidance on when
a person will be treated as authorized to act on the taxpayer's behalf in financial
matters for purposes of Section 651 1(h)(2)(B). This is a critical issue because,
even if a taxpayer otherwise qualifies as "financially disabled," the limitations
periods of Section 6511 run against the taxpayer during any period in which
someone was authorized to act for the taxpayer within the meaning of the statute.
Although the Service's current guidance on Section 6511(h) requires the person
signing the taxpayer's claim for refund to submit a written statement concerning
whether and for what periods someone was authorized to act for the taxpayer,
it does not specify the circumstances in which a person will be treated as
authorized. 87
As discussed earlier,388 the circumstances in which a person should be
treated as authorized for purposes of Section 6511(h)(2)(B) are narrow. The
general test for determining whether someone was authorized should be whether
the person could have claimed a refund on the taxpayer's behalf by signing and
filing an original or amended return.389 More specifically, with respect to a
taxpayer who was financially disabled before death but who is now deceased,
only the court-appointed personal representative of the taxpayer's estate should
be treated as authorized. The period of the personal representative's
authorization should begin only on the date the court issues letters testamentary
or letters of administration. 3" In the case of a taxpayer who is living but unable
to file her own claim for refund, only two categories of persons should be treated
as authorized to act on her behalf: (1) court-appointed fiduciaries such as a
383. See I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (1994).
384. See I.R.C. §§ 6721(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (1994), 6724(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
385. See I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1), 6724(a) (1994).
386. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1997), 301.6724-1(m)
(as amended in 1999).
387. See Rev. Proc. 99-21, § 4(2), 1999-17 I.R.B. 18.
388. See supranotes 331-45 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
390. See supranotes 332-33 and accompanying text.
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guardian or conservator, who should be treated as authorized beginning only on
the date of their appointment, and (2) agents who hold a written power of
attorney that specifically authorizes them to sign tax returns on the taxpayer's
behalf.39 '
Even if a person falls into one of the categories of those who should be
considered authorized to act on the taxpayer's behalf, there are circumstances in
which the limitations periods of Section 6511 nevertheless should not run against
the taxpayer. These situations include the incapacity or death of a taxpayer
who previously authorized a person to sign returns on her behalf 92 and the
victimization of a taxpayer by a fiduciary who acts adversely to the taxpayer's
interests." The Service's guidance should explicitly recognize the existence of
such exceptions and provide non-exclusive examples of them.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress's enactment of Section 6511(h) is laudable. Despite the
importance of preserving the government's sources of revenue and ensuring that
the government is not perpetually at risk of defending against stale claims,
compelling circumstances sometimes exist in which taxpayers are simply unable
to submit claims for refund within the prescribed limitations periods. Section
6511(h) is a welcome effort to permit relief in some of these exceptional cases.
Certain aspects of the statute, however, require modification. With these
changes the provision will be more responsive to the needs of the majority of
taxpayers who will seek its relief, less burdensome for both taxpayers and the
government, and more consistent with the statute's underlying policy.

391. See supra notes 334-40 and accompanying text.
392. See supranotes 341-42 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 343-45 and accompanying text.
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